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ABSTRACT 
This Article is based on a presentation at the 2012 conference on “Struggles for 
Recognition: Individuals, Peoples, and States” co-sponsored by Mercer University, 
the Concerned Philosophers for Peace, and the Carnegie Council for Ethics in 
International Affairs, and it seeks to help combat our human tendency to demonize 
the Other and thus to contribute in some small way to the reduction of unnecessary 
conflict and violence. The discussion takes the form of a conversation in a bar 
between four imagined protagonists, who have participated in the conference, and 
Clint Eastwood’s Dirty Harry, who is having a bad day questioning his immersion in 
a violent world. Their conversation touches on many different areas including 
political philosophy, jurisprudence, psychology, political conversation, international 
relations, legal history, comparative law, and even theology. Thus the conversation 
ranges from Francis Fukuyama’s notorious thesis, expounded in his 1992 book The 
End of History and the Last Man, about the ideological superiority of liberal 
democracy (and the paradigmatic type of human beings who inhabit liberal 
democracies at the end of History) to the values underlying medieval animal trials 
and The Confessions of Saint Augustine, and it culminates in an apocalyptic thought 
experiment involving a literal last man. 
AUTHOR NOTE: 
Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law, Oxford University (B.A. 1974; 
(M.A., 1979)); University of Michigan (LL.M., 1983). At the Concerned 
Philosophers for Peace Conference held at Mercer University at the end of October 
2012 at which I presented the talk that is the basis for this Article, I explained that I 
felt a bit of an interloper as I am not a trained professional philosopher. However, I 
have had great interest in the subject of philosophy ever since studying Jurisprudence 
as an undergraduate law student in the early 1970s. This interest received a 
significant boost following the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the 
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publication in 1992 of Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, 
which figures prominently in this Article. I am grateful to wonderful colleagues like 
Shawn Loht, Jack Sammons, and David Ritchie who have patiently tried to help me 
learn more of what I need to know. I am additionally grateful to David for organizing 
the conference and for inviting me to participate in it, to Jack for a lively and 
challenging email exchange that helped to develop the thinking reflected in this 
Article and for his comments on an earlier draft, and to former Mercer Law School 
Dean Gary Simson, a true scholar-dean, for the summer research grant that supported 
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onsider if you will two contrasting works of imagination. The first 
is a famous, or perhaps infamous, piece of dialogue at the 
beginning and the end of the 1971 movie Dirty Harry. In both scenes 
Clint Eastwood’s character, Inspector Harry Callahan, points his gun 
at a suspect whom he has wounded after an exchange of gunfire. When 
the suspect starts eyeing his firearm, which is within reach, Callahan 
says: 
I know what you’re thinking: “Did he fire six shots or only 
five?” Well, to tell you the truth, in all this excitement I kind 
of lost track myself. But being as this is a .44 Magnum, the 
most powerful handgun in the world, and would blow your 
head clean off, you’ve got to ask yourself one question: Do I 
feel lucky? Well, do ya, punk?1 
In the first scene, Callahan has just killed two armed bank robbers. 
The wounded suspect, the third robber, submits and then discovers that 
Callahan’s gun was empty. Callahan had already fired six shots.2 In 
the second scene, the wounded suspect goes for his gun and is fatally 
shot by Callahan, who it turns out had fired only five shots during a 
preceding running gun battle.3 We can usefully fold into this dialogue 
another famous, or infamous, piece of dialogue from the 1983 Dirty 
Harry movie Sudden Impact in which Harry Callahan kills three armed 
robbers in a coffee shop, confronts a slightly wounded fourth armed 
robber who has put a gun to the head of a hostage, points his gun at the 
robber, and utters the memorable line “Go ahead; make my day.” Here 
again, the robber submits.4 
The second work of imagination is an extract from a well-known 
poem Strange Meeting by the First World War poet Wilfred Owen: 
      
           
                                                
1 DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. 1971). The quoted language is from the first scene. 
The dialogue in the second scene is very similar but there are subtle variations, 
including the addition of a second use of the term “punk” in the first line after 
“thinking.” 
2 Id. In this scene, Callahan sees a bank robbery in progress and intervenes. For 
the scene, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Xjr2hnOHiM. 
3 Id. In this scene, Callahan chases the serial killer Scorpio who grabs a young 
boy as a hostage. Callahan wounds Scorpio in the shoulder and the boy escapes. 
For the scene, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V7NciGVuHE& 
feature=iv&src_vid=8Xjr2hnOHiM&annotation_id=annotation_563540. 
4 SUDDEN IMPACT (Warner Bros. 1983). In this scene, Callahan intervenes to end 
an armed robbery taking place in the coffee shop. For the scene, see 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ishbTwXf1g. 
C 
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It seemed that out of the battle I escaped 
Down some profound dull tunnel, long since scooped 
Through granites which titanic wars had groined. 
Yet also there encumbered sleepers groaned, 
Too fast in thought or death to be bestirred. 
Then, as I probed them, one sprang up, and stared 
With piteous recognition in fixed eyes, 
Lifting distressful hands as if to bless. 
And by his smile, I knew that sullen hall; 
By his dead smile I knew we stood in Hell. 
With a thousand fears that vision’s face was grained; 
Yet no blood reached there from the upper ground, 
And no guns thumped, or down the flues made moan. 
“Strange friend,” I said, “Here is no cause to mourn.” 
“None,” said the other, “Save the undone years, 
The hopelessness. Whatever hope is yours, 
Was my life also. . . . . 
I am the enemy you killed, my friend. 
I knew you in the dark; for so you frowned 
Yesterday through me as you jabbed and killed. 
I parried; but my hands were loath and cold. 
Let us sleep now. . .”5 
 
Each of these two works of imagination portrays extreme 
violence—violent death or the threat of violent death. In the Dirty 
Harry movies, the violence is internal to a society, the United States, 
and the deaths are those of criminal suspects many would characterize 
as “enemies of society.” In the Owen poem, the violence is between 
societies at war with one another, Great Britain and Germany, and the 
deaths are those of a German soldier and a British soldier who are 
“enemies” and foreign foes of one another. 
In each case, the violence is tragic, as perhaps all violence 
ultimately is, not least because of its normalization.6 Perhaps, indeed, 
                                                
5        Wilfred Owen, STRANGE MEETING (1919). The poem was written in the spring  
       or early summer of 1918. Kenneth Simcox, Strange Meeting, The Wilfred Owen 
       Association (2000), http://www.wilfredowen.org.uk/poetry/strange-meeting.  
       Owen was killed one week before the end of the War. This Day in History:    
       November 4, 1918: Poet Wilfred Owen killed in action, HISTORY.COM,  
       http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/poet-wilfred-owen-killed-in-action. 
6 This tragic normalization is acknowledged in the Bible when the first particular 
sin committed by a human being after expulsion from Paradise is Cain’s murder 
of his brother Abel. Genesis 4:1-12. For a wonderfully insightful treatment of 
violence as the central problem in the human condition and as the problem that 
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the protagonists in the two cases could have avoided at least some of 
the tragedy by making a different decision in the deadly situation they 
faced—perhaps Harry Callahan could have refrained from daring the 
criminal suspects in front of him and running the risk of provoking 
another fatal outcome; and perhaps the German soldier and the British 
soldier could have chosen to surrender rather than to fight, much as the 
wounded third armed robber in Dirty Harry or the slightly wounded 
fourth armed robber in Sudden Impact chose to do. But the situations 
were already pathological by then and the room for maneuver very 
constrained. The deeper tragedy is that these pathological situations 
and the deadly violence they engendered were the culmination of 
countless individual and collective decisions about how to treat others, 
each decision having an incremental causative effect in socially 
constructing the “punks” or the “foreign foe” and in producing the 
ultimate tragic outcome. 
Despite these similarities, the two works could not be more 
different. The Dirty Harry movies do not move beyond the deadly 
violence. Indeed, they portray such violence as the only solution to 
dealing with the simple, one dimensional “punks” that plague society.7 
The Owen poem does move beyond the deadly violence, and it does so 
by taking us to a place beyond death in which each soldier, with whom 
we are of course invited to identify, can recognize “the enemy,” the 
“foreign foe,” as a complex, multidimensional human being just like 
himself, to a place indeed in which he, and we, can recognize him as a 
“friend.” This is a dramatic and radical shift in perspective and Owen 
wants us to make it this side of the grave. 
One goal of this Article, then, is to help avoid or minimize the type 
of pathological situations and associated deadly violence portrayed in 
these two works by supporting Owen’s poetic argument for making 
this shift in perspective with an extended philosophical argument. This 
argument is aimed at improving the quality of the causative decisions 
about how to treat others that can otherwise lead to such tragic 
outcomes. However, there is a second goal too. The pathological 
situations and associated deadly violence in these two works can also 
be seen as extreme metaphors for lesser degrees of conflict and 
                                                                                                               
is centrally addressed in the Hebrew Bible, see RABBI JONATHAN SACKS, NOT 
IN GOD’S NAME: CONFRONTING RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE (2015). 
7 Much of the popularity of the Dirty Harry movies lies in the perceived failures 
of the criminal justice system to address the problem of violent crime 
effectively. See, e.g., PATRICK MCGILLIGAN, CLINT: THE LIFE AND LEGEND, 209 
(1999). 
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associated “violence,” whether that violence is physical or 
psychological, and the argument is aimed at improving the quality of 
causative decisions about how to treat others that result in these lesser 
conflicts and associated “violence” as well. 
However, the argument is not utopian, aimed at eliminating 
conflict completely. That would probably be undesirable anyway. 
Instead, it is aimed at cultivating a particular kind of “recognition” 
among parties to conflict that will help promote a healthier resolution 
to conflicts, both those that occur within a national society and those 
that occur between societies. The goal is to help counteract our all-too-
human tendency to demonize the “Other” or, given the context of the 
imagined conversation below—and if I may be permitted a 
neologism—to “punkify” the “Other.” When we do this, we strip the 
“Other” of his or her humanity. And even when we dialogue with the 
“Other,” often we do not really connect and we might as well be 
talking to an “empty chair.” The challenge, then, is to discover how to 
put a real human being in the chair—not a “punkified” caricature. The 
argument proceeds in the form of another exercise of the 
imagination—an imaginary conversation with Inspector Harry 
Callahan. It will seek to persuade him to shift from the perspective of 
Dirty Harry to the perspective of Wilfred Owen. And if you would 
enjoy the irony, you can even imagine the conversation taking place 
with an empty chair (although I hope that the chair will appear to be 
filled by a more human and sympathetic character by the end of it).8 
But first we must set the scene. 
SETTING THE SCENE:  
Professor Polly Anna Hope, a faculty member at Mercer 
University Law School, has just made three new friends at a 
                                                
8 At the Philosophers for Peace Conference itself, and given Clint Eastwood’s 
then recent performance at the 2012 Republican Convention, during which he 
talked to an imagined President Obama sitting in an empty chair, I was unable to 
resist the temptation to conduct this conversation by talking to an empty chair in 
which I asked the audience to imagine Clint Eastwood was sitting as Dirty 
Harry. However, the reader will understand that what follows is an imaginary 
conversation that in no way should be understood as necessarily representing the 
views of the real life actor/director known as Clint Eastwood. He is definitely 
“in role” as Dirty Harry. The reader should also assume that the fictional 
Inspector Callahan or Dirty Harry, as portrayed here, has no objection to the 
recording of our conversation with him and to publication of the transcript of 
that conversation with notes. 
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Concerned Philosophers for Peace Conference on “Struggles for 
Recognition: Nonviolent Movements for Individual and Group 
Recognition” being held on the Mercer campus in her home town of 
Macon, Georgia. At the end of the first day’s proceedings they have 
dinner at a restaurant in town and then decide to go to a local bar, “The 
Wishful Thinker,” for a nightcap. As they went to dinner straight from 
the conference, they still have the materials they used in various 
presentations they made during the day. Sitting at the bar is someone 
who bears an uncanny resemblance to Clint Eastwood, aka Inspector 
Harry Callahan or Dirty Harry.9 Intrigued, they go up to the bar, sit 
down, and order some drinks. Noticing that the object of their curiosity 
is staring into his glass and looking rather glum, Professor Hope 
engages him in conversation. 
Professor Hope: Excuse me, I don’t mean to intrude, but aren’t 
you. . . . ? 
Dirty Harry: Yeah, I’m Harry Callahan, what about it? 
Professor Hope: Well, it’s just that you seem rather down in the 
dumps, and I was wondering if you would like to talk about whatever 
is bothering you. 
Dirty Harry: I don’t think so. Thanks anyway. 
Professor Hope (persistently): Are you sure? My friends and I are 
attending a Concerned Philosophers for Peace Conference at Mercer 
University here in Macon. My name is Polly Anna Hope; I teach 
Comparative Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). And 
these are my friends—Professor Telly O. Logie: he’s a professional 
philosopher (his nickname is “Kojak” by the way)10; Professor Rhett 
Roe: he is a legal historian; and Father Francis Pope: he teaches at a 
                                                
9 Readers who find their credulity strained by the notion that one might encounter 
Clint Eastwood, aka Inspector Callahan or Dirty Harry, in a bar in Macon, 
Georgia are referred to http://gatewaymacon.org/top-5-lists/movies-filmed-
macon.com (discussing the films that have been made in Macon, including 
TROUBLE WITH THE CURVE, starring Clint Eastwood). See TROUBLE WITH THE 
CURVE (Malpaso Productions 2012). 
10 For the benefit of those who are not of a certain age, Kojak was an American TV 
series in the 1970s starring the actor Aristotelis “Telly” Savalas as the title 
character, Lieutenant Theodore “Theo” Kojak, a bald detective in the New York 
City Police Department with a predilection for Tootsie Roll Pops and for 
uttering the phrase “Who loves ya, baby?” See Raymond Hernandez, Telly 
Savalas, Actor, Dies at 70; Played ‘Kojak’ in 70’s TV Series, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
23, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/23/obituaries/telly-savalas-actor-
dies-at-70-played-kojak-in-70-s-tv-series.html. 
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Roman Catholic seminary. So we’re quite a diverse bunch, and quite 
thoughtful. You never know; we might have something helpful to say. 
Dirty Harry: A bunch of egg head peaceniks—I doubt it. But I 
must admit, I am experiencing something of what you clever Dicks 
would call “an existential crisis,” a moment of serious “angst.” 
Professor Hope (unable to resist a bit of arguably inappropriate 
academic humor): But “angst” is good. For a moment there I was 
worried it was “ennui.” So, what seems to be the source of this 
“angst”? 
Dirty Harry: There seems to be so much violence and violent 
death in the world–wars, terrorism, mass murders, other murders and 
maiming. Everywhere you look there seems to be violent conflict. And 
it seems, too, that the usual response to violence is yet more violence. 
Hell, look at me. In my movies, I often resort to force and violence as 
a solution to conflict, as in “Go ahead; make my day” or “[Y]ou’ve got 
to ask yourself one question: Do I feel lucky? Well, do ya, punk”? And 
then, as often as not, I blow them away. My character lives in a world 
full of “punks.” But, recently I have been wondering whether there 
might be a better way to a better world. The trouble is, I just can’t see 
what that might be. It’s getting me down, so here I am in this bar. 
Professor Hope: You know, I think maybe we can help. Perhaps 
Professor Logie can get us started. 
I. THE LONG MARCH TOWARD “THE END OF HISTORY”: FROM 
THRONES TO CHAIRS IN THE “STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION”— 
SPIRITUAL JUSTICE PART ONE 
Professor Logie: Well, Inspector Callahan, my views have been 
greatly influenced by what one could call “the Hegel-Kojève-
Fukuyama school of political philosophy.”11 
Dirty Harry: The what? What the hell is that? 
                                                
11 The views presented by Professor Logie in this exchange with Dirty Harry are 
based on the argument in FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND 
THE LAST MAN (1992). As we will see below, the “struggle for recognition” is 
central to Fukuyama’s thesis that modern liberal democracy represents the 
endpoint in the historical evolution of mankind’s political ideas. In articulating 
this thesis Fukuyama draws upon Hegel’s account of a Universal History as 
interpreted by Alexandre Kojève in the 1930s. For Fukuyama’s discussion of 
Hegel’s Universal History and the Hegelian dialectic between societies 
culminating in the “end of history,” see id. at 59-64. For Fukuyama’s discussion 
of Kojève and his work as Hegel’s “greatest interpreter in the twentieth 
century,” see id. at 65-67. 
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Professor Logie: It’s a little complicated and will take a while to 
explain; but I do need to explain it before you will be able to see my 
main point about violence—if you can bear with me. 
Dirty Harry: Well, I haven’t got anything better to do. And it 
should be entertaining to see you get your academic knickers in a 
tangle. 
Professor Logie (somewhat perplexed and embarrassed by this 
reference to his academic knickers12): In his book The End of History 
and the Last Man, published in 1992, Francis Fukuyama gives an 
account of a “Universal History” that is “coherent and directional” and 
that culminates in the “end of history,”13 not in the sense that 
important events will cease to occur but in the sense that “the end 
point of mankind’s ideological evolution” has been reached with the 
realization of “the final form of human government.”14 Fukuyama’s 
particular thesis is that the economic and political organization of 
societies has developed through different stages from the violent 
situation of the “first men” in a “state of nature” at the beginning of 
History to their culmination in the relatively peaceful situation of the 
“last men” in liberal democracy at the end of History. Liberal 
democracy is thus the best arrangement and superior to all alternatives 
such as “monarchy, aristocracy, theocracy, fascism, communist 
totalitarianism, or whatever ideology [people] happened to believe 
in.”15 
Dirty Harry: What? Are you telling me that the “end of history” is 
reached when a bunch of liberal Democrats are in charge of 
everything? I bet you voted for Obama, didn’t you? 
Professor Logie: No, I’m not saying that; and I’m not telling you 
whom I voted for. 
Dirty Harry: You don’t have to. You academics are all the same. 
Anyway, do go on. What are you saying, then? 
Professor Logie (feeling quite smug because he actually voted for 
the Green Party ticket): Fukuyama defines liberal democracy as “the 
doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty”16 and 
                                                
12 Professor Logie is perplexed by Dirty Harry’s apparent use of this common 
expression to suggest his anticipation that the argument might become tangled 
and confused. 
13 FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at xii. 
14 Id. at xi-xii (quoting from Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, NAT’L 
INTEREST 4 (Summer 1989)). 
15 Id. at 211. 
16 Id. at 42. 
322 UMass Law Review v. 11 | 312 
understands it as comprising three main elements: (a) Political 
liberalism, which is “a rule of law that recognizes certain individual 
rights or freedoms from government control”17; (b) Democracy, which 
is “the right held universally by all citizens to have a share of political 
power, that is the right of all citizens to vote and participate in 
politics,” and which “can be thought of as yet another liberal right”18; 
and (c) Economic liberalism, which is “the recognition of the right of 
free economic activity and economic exchange based on private 
property and markets” and which also goes by the name of 
“capitalism” or “free-market economics.”19 
Dirty Harry: Okay, I get that liberal democracy is not necessarily 
a bunch of liberal Democrats being in charge of everything. But why 
does the historical process culminate in these particular economic and 
political arrangements rather than in some fascist or communist 
dictatorship? 
Professor Logie: Integrating the logic of modern natural science 
and the Anglo-Saxon account of liberalism, represented by Hobbes 
and Locke, with the Continental European account of liberalism, 
represented by Hegel-Kojève, Fukuyama concludes that the process of 
historical development must inevitably culminate in the idea of liberal 
democracy and that there is no set of economic and political 
arrangements superior to liberal democracy. He claims further that this 
conclusion is verified by the apparent verdict of history, consisting in 
the triumph of liberal democracy over its competitors in the twentieth 
century, such as fascism or communism. 
The deep explanation for this theoretical conclusion and for the 
apparent verdict of history is rooted in certain truths about human 
nature or in “a trans-historical concept of man.”20 Specifically, it is 
rooted in the tripartite division of the soul first explicated by Plato but 
                                                
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 43. Fukuyama stresses that “[i]t is possible for a country to be liberal 
without being particularly democratic” and “[i]t is also possible for a country to 
be democratic without being liberal, that is without protecting the rights of 
individuals and minorities.” Id. at 43-44. 
19 Id. at 44. Fukuyama stresses that “there are many possible interpretations of this 
rather broad definition of economic liberalism, ranging from the United States of 
Ronald Reagan and the Britain of Margaret Thatcher to the social democracies 
of Scandinavia and the relatively statist regimes in Mexico and India.” Id. 
20 See id. at 137-39. For discussion of the difficulty in justifying a particular 
understanding of human nature or “trans-historical concept of man,” see id. at 
364 n.7. 
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accepted, albeit with varying terminology, by Western philosophers up 
to Rousseau.21 I need to explain all this in more detail so that I can 
highlight my main point. 
Dirty Harry: Knock yourself out; I’m all ears. And I’m still 
looking forward to you getting your academic knickers all in a tangle. 
Professor Logie (still embarrassed, though not quite as much as 
before): I will try to avoid doing that. Well, anyway, in the Republic 
Plato famously gives a metaphysical account of the soul that also 
represents a human psychology—an account of human nature, if you 
will. He identifies three parts to the soul—a reasoning part, a 
“spirited” part, and a desiring part that is the source of bodily appetites 
and material desires.22 Fukuyama grounds his own “end of history” 
thesis in the following understanding of Plato’s account: 
Plato in the Republic . . . noted that there were three parts to 
the soul, a desiring part, a reasoning part, and a part that he 
called thymos, or “spiritedness.” Much of human behavior 
can be explained as a combination of the first two parts, 
desire and reason: desire induces men to seek things outside 
themselves, while reason or calculation shows them the best 
way to get them. But in addition, human beings seek 
recognition of their own worth, or of the people, things, or 
principles that they invest with worth. The propensity to 
invest the self with a certain value, and to demand 
recognition for that value, is what in today’s popular 
language we would call “self-esteem.” The propensity to feel 
self-esteem arises out of the part of the soul called thymos. It 
is like an innate human sense of justice. People believe that 
they have a certain worth, and when other people treat them 
as though they are worth less than that, they experience the 
emotion of anger. Conversely, when people fail to live up to 
their own sense of worth, they feel shame, and when they are 
evaluated correctly in proportion to their worth, they feel 
pride. The desire for recognition, and the accompanying 
emotions of anger, shame, and pride, are parts of the human 
personality critical to political life.23 
                                                
21 Id. at 162-63, 368 n.5. See infra note 41 (discussing the varying terminology 
used by Western philosophers over the centuries). 
22 For an accessible treatment of Plato’s “tripartite theory of the self or the soul or 
psyche or personality” as “the form, idea, or essence of man” and the arena of 
“psychological conflict,” see T.Z. LAVINE, FROM SOCRATES TO SARTRE: THE 
PHILOSOPHIC QUEST 49-53 (1984). 
23 FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at xvi-xvii. For Fukuyama’s more detailed 
discussion of Plato’s account in the Republic, see id. at 163-66, 183. Fukuyama 
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In addition to emotions such as anger, shame, and pride, as well as 
the desire for recognition, courage is rooted in thymos.24 It is also the 
psychological seat of other virtues such as selflessness, idealism, 
morality, self-sacrifice, honorability, generosity, and public-
spiritedness, as well as resistance to tyranny.25 However, as we will 
see, thymos has a “dark side” as well as a more benign side. 
The historical process has been driven forward by the search to 
overcome the specific contradiction peculiar to each particular form of 
human society and to achieve a “form of social and political 
organization that is completely satisfying to human beings in their most 
essential characteristics.”26 In other words, it has been driven forward 
by the search to satisfy all three parts of the soul. Two main forces or 
“mechanisms” explain the “directionality and coherence of History.”27 
First, the historical process has been driven forward by “the 
progressive unfolding of modern natural science” and economic 
imperatives rooted in the desiring part of the soul: 
[T]he progressive unfolding of modern natural science . . . 
emanates from the desiring part of the soul, which was 
liberated in early modern times and turned to the unlimited 
accumulation of wealth. This unlimited accumulation was 
made possible because of an alliance that was formed 
                                                                                                               
distinguishes analytically between thymos and the desire for recognition. Thus 
“Plato’s thymos is . . . the psychological seat of Hegel’s desire for recognition;” 
consequently, “[t]hymos and the ‘desire for recognition’ differ somewhat insofar 
as the former refers to a part of the soul that invests objects with value, whereas 
the latter is an activity of thymos that demands that another consciousness share 
the same valuation.” Id. at 165. 
24 Id. at 163, 183. 
25 Id. at 171, 181. See also LAVINE, supra note 22, at 49. “[The] spirited element 
[is] expressed in emotional drives such as anger, aggression, ambition, pride, 
protectiveness, honor, loyalty, courage.” Thymos is also clearly implicated in the 
process of self-evaluation and self-criticism—for example, regarding whether 
one has lived up to accepted standards of virtuous behavior. See FUKUYAMA, 
supra note 11, at 164 (discussing Socrates’ story about Leontius’ inner struggle 
over whether to look at a pile of corpses and contrasting the anger Leontius feels 
after losing the battle with the pride he would have felt had he won it). 
26 FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 135-36. 
27 Id. at xiv (referring to natural science as “a regulator or mechanism”); id. at 144 
(referring to “an alternative ‘mechanism’. . . based on ‘the struggle for 
recognition’”). 
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between desire and reason: capitalism is inextricably bound 
to modern natural science.28 
In fact, “the logic of advanced industrialization, determined by 
modern natural science, creates a strong predisposition in favor of 
capitalism and market economics,”29 that is, economic liberalism.30 
Although there is “a very strong overall correlation between 
advancing socio-economic modernization and the emergence of new 
democracies,”31 modern natural science and advanced industrialization 
cannot fully explain why societies would adopt political liberalism as 
well as economic liberalism.32 The reason is that humans are more 
than economic animals.33 As Fukuyama puts it: Man is more than 
“Economic Man;” he is also “thymotic man.”34 
Dirty Harry: “Thymotic man”! I think this might be the knickers 
tangle I’ve been waiting for. “The Thymotic Man” does sound like a 
good title for a movie, though. 
Professor Logie (no longer embarrassed and even a little irritated 
at these continued taunts and anticipatory Schadenfreude over the 
tangling of his academic knickers, but suddenly realizing that these 
exchanges are a mild example of thymotic conflict): Yes, Fukuyama 
points out that the concepts of thymos and the desire for recognition do 
sound very strange and unfamiliar to us nowadays.35 However, they 
are critical to Fukuyama’s thesis and, I suspect, to addressing your 
own existential crisis as the conversation develops further. 
So, in addition to the mechanism of natural science, and for a much 
longer time—for thousands of years in fact—the historical process has 
also been driven forward by a second force or mechanism: the desire 
                                                
28 Id. at 204. For more extended discussion of the role of modern natural science, 
see id. at xiv-xv, 72-81. For discussion of why the directionality provided by 
modern natural science is unlikely to be reversed, see id. at 82-88. 
29 Id. at 108-09. 
30 Id. at xv, 205-06. 
31 Id. at 112. See also id. at 205-06 (exploring the reasons for the correlation). 
32 See id. at xv, 112-25, 131-35, 238-44 (discussing the ultimate failure of various 
attempts to demonstrate that economic liberalism inevitably leads to political 
liberalism). 
33 Id. at 133-34. 
34 Id. at 180. 
35 Id. at 145, 162, 189-90 (noting the thoroughgoing “economization” of our 
thinking over the last few centuries). This is largely due to the influence on our 
thinking of the Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition, represented in particular by 
Hobbes and Locke. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
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for recognition rooted in the thymotic part of the soul.36 This second 
mechanism explains both why the historical process eventually 
culminates in liberal democracy and why there are deviations and 
discontinuities along the way.37 
Recall that psychologically thymos operates as something “like an 
innate human sense of justice.”38 Thus it “provides an all-powerful 
emotional support to the process of valuing and evaluating, and allows 
human beings to overcome their most powerful natural instincts for the 
sake of what they believe is right or just” both for themselves and for 
others.39 However, the self-assertion engendered by the thymotic 
desire for recognition is deeply paradoxical in that although thymos is 
“the psychological seat of justice and selflessness,” it is also “closely 
related to selfishness” because “[t]he thymotic self demands 
recognition for its own sense of the worthiness of things, both itself 
and of other people.”40 For this reason “[t]he desire for recognition 
remains a form of self-assertion, a projection of one’s own values on 
the outside world, and gives rise to feelings of anger when those 
values are not recognized by other people.”41 
Megalothymia is the desire to be recognized as superior to others. 
It can manifest itself benignly as, for example, in the desire of the 
                                                
36 The historical process at work here is very long-term, “measured in the 
thousands of years since the first appearance of master-slave social relations 
virtually up until the French Revolution.” FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 372 
n.2. See also id. at 207 (referring to “an historical march of ten thousand years or 
more”). 
37 See id. at 133-35. Here Fukuyama refers to “discontinuities in history” as 
including “the majority of man’s wars, the sudden eruptions of religious or 
ideological or nationalist passion that lead to phenomena like Hitler and 
Khomeini,” or again, “the wars and sudden eruptions of irrationality out of the 
calm of economic development, that have characterized actual human history.” 
Id. 
38 Supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
39 FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 171-72. 
40 Id. at 172. 
41 Id. Fukuyama identifies the varied terminology that has been used to refer to the 
same “psychological phenomenon” over the centuries, including thymos or 
“spiritedness” (Plato), “man’s desire for glory” (Machiavelli), “his pride or 
vainglory” (Hobbes), “his amour-propre” (Rousseau), “the love of fame” 
(Alexander Hamilton), “ambition” (James Madison), “recognition” (Hegel), and 
“man as the ‘beast with red cheeks’”(Nietzsche); id. at 162-63 (explaining that 
“[a]ll of these terms refer to that part of man which feels the need to place value 
on things—himself in the first instance, but on the people, actions, or things 
around him as well”). 
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concert pianist “to be recognized as the foremost interpreter of 
Beethoven.”42 However, it also has a very problematic “dark side” 
when it manifests as “the desire to dominate,” as in the case of the 
master over the slave, the tyrant who invades and enslaves his 
neighbors, or a power that engages in imperialism.43 Indeed, the “dark 
side to the desire for recognition . . . has led many philosophers to 
believe that thymos is the fundamental source of human evil.”44 
The historical process has been driven forward by the 
megalothymia of “masters,” and by the “struggle for recognition” on 
the part of “slaves”45 to which this gives rise. At the beginning of 
history society becomes divided into aristocratic masters and slaves as 
the result of a “battle for pure prestige” in which “two primordial 
combatants . . . seek to make the other ‘recognize’ their humanness by 
staking their lives in a mortal battle.”46 And “[w]hen the natural fear of 
death leads one combatant to submit, the relationship of master and 
slave is born.”47 One could perhaps characterize this outcome as the 
master sitting on a throne and the slave groveling at his feet. 
By demonstrating that he can overcome his natural instincts in this 
way, the master shows that he can exercise “free moral choice,” that is, 
that he has “free will”; and this is the essence of man’s specific 
dignity.48 However, the outcome of this battle for recognition is 
unsatisfactory for both masters and slaves, because “[t]he slave, of 
course, was not acknowledged as a human being in any way 
whatsoever. But the recognition enjoyed by the master was deficient as 
well, because he was not recognized by other masters, but slaves 
                                                
42 Id. at 182. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 181. 
45 Fukuyama clarifies that “[w]hen Kojève (or Hegel) refers to slaves, he is not 
speaking narrowly of people with the legal status of chattel, but of all people 
whose dignity is not ‘recognized,’ including, for example, the legally free 
peasantry in pre-Revolutionary France.” Id. at 372 n.2. 
46 Id. at xvi-xvii, 147-48. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 149-52. Like Kant and Hegel before him, Fukuyama is aware of the 
argument that free will is a chimera because all human behavior is, in fact, 
determined by physical or natural processes and forces. He side-steps this 
“tortured question,” as we will, by treating the issue not as a metaphysical one 
but as a psychological one: Thus, “[w]hether or not true free will exists, virtually 
all human beings act as if it does.” Id. at 151-52. 
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whose humanity was as yet incomplete.”49 This dissatisfaction or 
“contradiction” drives history forward,50 specifically because slaves 
took pride in their work, developed “something like a work ethic,” 
invented science and technology, and conceptualized the “idea of 
freedom” in the form of various philosophies or “slave ideologies.”51 
Christianity has been the most consequential of these “slave 
ideologies” because “[t]he Christian God recognizes all human beings 
universally, recognizes their individual human worth and dignity” 
based on the capacity of all men for moral choice and belief.52 
However, because Christianity postponed the realization of human 
freedom until the next life, completion of the historical process 
required the secularization of Christianity through a philosophy, such 
as Hegel’s own, that “translat[ed] . . . the Christian idea of freedom 
into the here-and-now.”53 It also required “one more bloody battle, the 
battle in which the slave liberates himself from the master,”54 This is 
the historical role of the French and American Revolutions: 
These democratic revolutions abolished the distinction 
between master and slave by making the former slaves their 
own masters and by establishing the principles of popular 
sovereignty and the rule of law. The inherently unequal 
recognition of masters and slaves is replaced by universal 
and reciprocal recognition, where every citizen recognizes 
the dignity and humanity of every other citizen, and where 
that dignity is recognized in turn by the state through the 
granting of rights.55 
In sum, just as the combination of reason and desire in the first 
mechanism leads to capitalism or economic liberalism, and 
institutionalizes “rational desire” in the marketplace,56 so also the 
combination of reason and thymos in the second mechanism leads to 
political liberalism and democracy, and institutionalizes “rational 
                                                
49 Id. at xvii. 
50 Id. For further discussion of this point, see id. at 192-94. 
51 Id. at 194-96. 
52 Id. at 196-97. 
53 Id. at 197-98. 
54 Id. at 198. 
55 Id. at xvii-xviii. 
56 Id. at 211-12, 337 (referring to “rational desire”). 
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recognition” in “[t]he universal and homogenous state.”57 In this state 
“the dignity of each person as a free and autonomous human being is 
recognized by all”58 and “an all pervasive isothymia, that is, the desire 
to be recognized as the equal of other people” has “ethically 
vanquished” megalothymia.59 Thus “[t]he internal ‘contradiction’ of 
the master-slave relationship was solved in a state which successfully 
synthesized the morality of the master and the morality of the slave.”60 
                                                
57 Id. at 204 (referring to “[t]he universal and homogenous state”), 200, 211-12, 
337 (referring to “rational recognition”). For a more detailed description of the 
“universal and homogenous state,” see id. at 200-04. 
58 Id. at 200. 
59 Id. at 190. One striking manifestation of this isothymia is the granting and 
protection of individual rights as ends in themselves. Id. at xviii, 202-03. 
60 Id. at 200-01, 203. The three parts of the soul or psyche—reason, thymos, and 
desire—can perhaps be viewed as psychological functionalities that reflect 
distinctive attributes of human biology and underpin various types of ethic. For 
fascinating and suggestive discussion, see, e.g., Darcia Narvaez, Wisdom as 
Mature Moral Functioning: Insights from Developmental Psychology and 
Neurobiology, in TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING: CHARACTER, PRACTICAL 
WISDOM, AND PROFESSIONAL FORMATION 28-31 (Mark L. Jones, Paul A. 
Lewis, & Kelly R. Reffitt, eds. 2013) and the further references therein 
(describing three ethical orientations—the ethic of security, the ethic of 
engagement, and the ethic of imagination—that are rooted in neurobiological 
capacities and unconscious emotional systems shaped by experience) 
[hereinafter Narvaez, Mature Moral Functioning]. See also Darcia Narvaez, The 
Neurobiology of Moral Functioning and Moral Formation 1-8 [on file with 
author] (same) [hereinafter Narvaez, Neurobiology]; KAREN ARMSTRONG, 
TWELVE STEPS TO A COMPASSIONATE LIFE 13-14, 17 (2010) (discussing our 
“old brain” inherited from reptilian ancestors and predisposing to an interest in 
“status, power, control, territory, sex, personal gain, and survival;” the 
mammalian limbic system that generates “positive emotions of compassion, joy, 
serenity, and maternal affection;” and our “‘new brain,’ the neocortex, home of 
the reasoning powers that enable us to reflect on the world and on ourselves, and 
to stand back from . . . instinctive, primitive passions”). 
  Expressions of thymos, especially of megalothymia, seem to be related to 
our human tendency to form groups and to seek our identity through 
membership in such groups. For an illuminating discussion of how our instinct 
to form groups likely evolved through the natural selection of those groups 
whose members practiced “reciprocal altruism,” is reinforced in larger groups 
by organized religion’s creation of “moral communities” that establish trust 
between strangers, and can easily and naturally lead to violence and war 
between the in-group (Us) and rival out-groups (Them) in the competition for 
scarce resources and for power, territory, and glory, see SACKS, supra note 6, at 
27-39 (2015). For Sacks, the source of much of the violence between groups, as 
between individuals, is “mimetic desire” born of “sibling rivalry” in which one 
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In other words, instead of a master sitting on a throne and the slave 
groveling at his feet, each of them now sits in his own chair. 
I’m sorry but I think I have been “lecturing” you. I do tend to get 
carried away because I find all this so absorbing. I hope you don’t 
mind. 
Dirty Harry: Hey, I don’t have anything better to do. And some of 
this stuff is really good. I mean—first, capitalism and “job creators.” 
And now, aristocratic masters and megalothymia—sounds like just 
what we need to deal with the punks. I particularly liked the way the 
slaves submitted to save their lives in the bloody battle for pure 
prestige—just like the punks who submitted to me outside the bank 
and in the coffee shop. They understood who was in charge. And as 
for those punks who didn’t, well, they’re dead.61 But, this really isn’t 
helping me with my problem. I am not seeing a better way yet. 
Professor Logie (concerned that Dirty Harry seems to be missing 
the point and that he will have to be more explicit): Okay, well in that 
case I think we need to talk more specifically about the problem of 
violence. The Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition, represented by Hobbes 
and Locke, and the Continental European liberal tradition, represented 
by Hegel-Kojève, agree that violence is a central problem, both among 
the first men in the state of nature and in history, and that it originates 
in what we have been calling the thymotic part of the soul. In their 
various “experiments in thought” depicting the situation of the “first 
men” in the state of nature,62 for example, Hegel-Kojève talk about the 
bloody battle for pure prestige; Hobbes famously talks about the war 
of “every man against every man” fueled by pride and vanity; and 
                                                                                                               
sibling wants to have what the other sibling has or to be what the other sibling 
is. Id. at 87-90. For further discussion, see infra notes 63, 102. 
61 Cf. FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 147 (discussing three possible outcomes of 
the primordial bloody battle for pure prestige: “the death of both combatants, . . . 
the death of one of the contestants, . . . [o]r . . . the relationship of lordship and 
bondage, in which one of the contestants decides to submit to a life of slavery 
rather than face the risk of violent death”). 
62 Id. at 146 (claiming that Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Hegel all undertook “a 
kind of experiment in thought” portraying “the First Man, that is, man in the 
‘state of nature,’” even though Hegel resisted such terminology himself, their 
goal being “to strip away those aspects of the human personality that were 
simply the product of convention . . . and to uncover those characteristics that 
were common to man as man” and thus “that existed prior to the creation of civil 
society and the historical process”). However, in contrast to Hobbes, for 
example, Hegel intended his account to depict an actual historical stage. Id. at 
365 n.2. 
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Locke also agrees that the state of nature potentially degenerates into 
war or anarchy.63 Moreover, both traditions converge on liberal 
democracy as the solution. However, they get there in very different 
ways. 
As we have seen, Hegel-Kojève accept the necessity and indeed 
the value of thymos and the struggle for recognition. By contrast, for 
Hobbes and Locke, thymos and the “prideful quest for recognition” 
must be suppressed, or at least strongly subordinated, to the desire for 
self-preservation (Hobbes) or to the desire for self-preservation and 
material comfort (Locke).64 Thus the first men in the state of nature set 
up a government to maintain social peace and achieve these purposes, 
through a social contract founded upon “enlightened self-interest— 
desire combined with reason.”65 This also means, of course, that 
although the Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition helps to explain why 
human beings would favor economic liberalism, or capitalism, it 
                                                
63 Id. at 146-52 (Hegel), 154-56 (Hobbes), 158 (Locke). According to Rabbi 
Jonathan Sacks, our natural tendency towards group identity and resulting 
violence and war between rival groups, supra note 60, can take a “mutant form, 
pathological dualism, that divides the world into two—our side, the children of 
light, and the other side, the children of darkness.” SACKS, supra note 6, at 100-
02. This simplistic division of humanity into good versus evil is rooted in the 
tendency to reduce complexity through dualism and the need to forestall 
potential violence within the group by projecting it onto outsiders as scapegoat 
(as, for example, in anti-Semitism), and produces a “threefold defeat of 
morality” whereby people dehumanize and demonize their enemies (which 
destroys empathy and sympathy), see themselves as victims (which deflects 
moral responsibility by blaming outsiders), and commit “altruistic evil” (which 
“turns ordinary human beings into murderers in the name of high ideals,” 
especially religious ideals, that is, in the name of an “altruistic cause”). Id. at 44-
86. These processes of pathological dualism “activate the most primitive part of 
the brain . . . with its instant and overwhelming defensive reactions . . . that, 
under stress . . . can entirely overwhelm the slower-moving prefrontal cortex.” 
Id. at 56, 86. 
64 FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at xviii, 156-59, 184-85. 
65 Id. at xviii, 156-60, 184-85, 200, 203 (explicating the differences in the terms of 
the respective social contracts—the absolute government of Hobbes and the 
limited government and majority rule of Locke—and observing that government 
protects individual rights not so much as “ends in themselves” providing 
recognition but “to a large extent . . . as a means of preserving a private sphere 
where men can enrich themselves and satisfy the desiring parts of their souls”). 
The typical result, then, is “a new type” of human being, the bourgeois private 
individual, who is selfishly concerned with his own self-preservation and 
material well-being and is “neither public-spirited, nor virtuous, nor dedicated to 
the larger community.” Id. at 145, 160, 185. 
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cannot in fact adequately explain why human beings favor political 
liberalism and democracy, even though it champions these things as 
well. The reason, it bears repeating, is because “the striving for liberal 
democracy . . . ultimately arises out of thymos, the part of the soul that 
demands recognition.”66 
Consequently, a full account of liberal democracy, and of the 
relatively peaceful situation of the “last men” who inhabit liberal 
democracies, requires the integration of both traditions, and in fact this 
is what has occurred. Thus, “while the Anglo-Saxon democracies may 
have been founded on explicitly Lockean grounds, their self-
understanding has never been purely Lockean.”67 As a result, “[w]hen 
people in contemporary America talk about their society and form of 
government, they frequently use language that is more Hegelian than 
Lockean,”68 as emphasis upon the concept of “human dignity” in the 
language of the civil rights movement clearly attests.69 
By integrating the two traditions, then, we can understand more 
readily why the particular economic and political arrangements of 
liberal democracy optimally satisfy all three parts of the soul.70 In turn, 
this means that we can also more readily understand why these 
arrangements conduce to social peace and why there is such emphasis 
upon compassion and “a steadily decreasing tolerance for violence, 
death, and suffering.”71 Similarly, these arrangements also conduce to 
international peace. Thus, with the demotion of aristocratic masters 
and with the gains from economic development, liberal democracies—
or perhaps one should rather say, mature liberal democracies—are not 
                                                
66 Id. at xviii, 159-61, 199-200. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text 
(noting that “Man is more than ‘Economic Man;’ he is also ‘thymotic man’”). 
67 FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 203. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 203-04. For perhaps two of the most striking recent examples at the time 
of latest writing (July 2015), see e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013) (ruling Article 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 
containing at least ten explicit references to human dignity and several 
additional allusions to such dignity in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion); 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (ruling that the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires recognition of the validity of 
same-sex marriages and containing at least eleven explicit references to human 
dignity and, again, several additional allusions to such dignity in Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion). 
70 FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 136, 200, 206, 337. 
71 See id. at 259-61. 
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interested in megalothymotic, imperialistic attempts to dominate other 
countries militarily; and they especially have no interest in dominating 
one another in this way, as is evidenced by the fact that “there have 
been few, if any, instances of one liberal democracy going to war with 
another.”72 
So, there you have it, as they say—one very important way to 
reduce violence and conflict both within and between societies is for 
them to become liberal democracies. I wonder if my friends have 
anything to add to what I have said. 
Professor Roe: I really like the arguments in favor of liberal 
democracy as the best way to organize society. But, speaking as an 
historian, your historical account seems highly general and abstract. 
So, I wonder just how accurate and balanced it can be. I suspect the 
devil is in the details. 
Professor Logie: Well, you are right that such a Universal History 
omits a great deal. But it does so in order that we will not fail to see 
the wood for the trees. Instead, it tries to reveal the rational pattern in 
events and the general direction in which humanity is moving. I should 
also mention that Fukuyama’s more recent work does explore the 
historical details in considerable depth, examining what specifically is 
required for societies to be able to attain liberal democracy (namely, 
functioning states, the rule of law, and accountable government) and 
the concrete obstacles that must be overcome to achieve it.73 However, 
despite the existence of such obstacles, Fukuyama does not seem to 
have abandoned the historical determinism that underpins The End of 
History and the Last Man.74 It should be remembered, too, that this 
                                                
72 Id. at xx, 260-65, 271-72. Of course, liberal democracies may still fight 
defensive wars with states that are not liberal democracies. Id. at 263, 267. On 
the nationalist excesses of immature liberal democracies, see infra note 102. 
73 See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER: 
FROM PREHUMAN TIMES TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (2011); FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY: FROM THE 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY (2014). 
74 See Francis Fukuyama, At the ‘End of History’ Still Stands Democracy, WALL 
ST. J. (June 6, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/at-the-end-of-history-still-
stands-democracy-1402080661 (“In the realm of ideas . . . liberal democracy 
still doesn’t have any real competitors. . . Even as we raise questions about how 
soon everyone will get there, we should have no doubt as to what kind of society 
lies at the end of History.”); see also, e.g., Ian Morris, How to Get to the End of 
History, SLATE (May 2, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/books/ 
2011/05/how_to_get_to_the_end_of_history.html; Glen Austin Sproviero, 
Beyond the End of History: Fukuyama’s Myopic Vision, THE U. BOOKMAN 
(Mar. 24, 2013), http://www.kirkcenter.org/index.php/bookman/article/beyond-
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earlier book has more of the character of political philosophy, whereas 
the recent books are more political history and political science. 
Professor Hope: I would like to ask about something you said 
towards the end. You suggested that because liberal democracy 
optimally satisfies all three parts of the soul we can more readily 
understand why it conduces to social peace. This reminded me of the 
expression “No peace without justice.” 
Professor Logie: Now that is very interesting. I like where I think 
you’re going with it, but perhaps you can explain more exactly where 
you see the connection between justice and peace with regard to the 
soul so I can be sure. 
Professor Hope: Well, it seems that the historical process you 
describe can be regarded as a search for justice and the overcoming of 
various types of injustice. But whatever specific issues may have been 
the focus of particular claims for justice during the historical process, 
those claims have also necessarily involved the thymotic part of the 
soul and the struggle to tame the megalothymia of aristocratic societies 
and transform it into the isothymia of liberal democracies. Couldn’t 
one say, therefore, that this transformation of megalothymia into 
isothymia represents a rebalancing and more just redistribution of 
thymotic value or thymotic energy between the souls of masters and 
slaves—which one can picture, as you have done, by each citizen now 
sitting in his or her own chair instead of the master sitting on the 
throne and the slave groveling at his feet—resulting in greater 
harmony, or peace, between their souls? And by the same token, 
doesn’t that redistribution also produce a rebalancing and more just 
distribution of thymotic energy within each of their souls, resulting in 
greater harmony, or peace, within those souls? Indeed, doesn’t Plato 
himself regard justice within the soul as being a condition in which all 
the parts of the soul are in harmony or proper balance? And couldn’t 
this achievement of peace as a result of a more just distribution of 
thymos between and within souls be described as achieving peace 
through a type of “spiritual” or psychic justice? Moreover, isn’t there 
an important link between such internal “spiritual” justice and external 
acts of justice, so that the more of the former there is, the more of the 
                                                                                                               
the-end-of-history-fukuyamas-myopic-vision/; Glenn C. Altschuler, ‘Political 
Order and Political Decay’ by Francis Fukuyama: review, SFGATE (Oct. 29, 
2014), http://www.sfgate.com/books/article/Political-Order-and-Political-
Decay-by-5856742.php (book reviews). 
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latter there is likely to be too—and indeed vice-versa, at least over 
time once resentments on the part of those who lost have diminished? 
Professor Logie: This is where I thought you were going. Those 
are excellent thoughts. And you are absolutely right about Plato, of 
course. Interestingly, at the very end of his book, Fukuyama does seem 
to connect his thesis to the idea of justice in the soul when he says that 
for Plato “[t]he just city was one in which all three parts of the soul 
were satisfied and brought into balance under the guidance of reason,” 
and “it would seem that liberal democracy gives fullest scope to all 
three parts. If it would not qualify as the most just regime ‘in speech,’ 
it might serve as the most just regime ‘in reality.’”75 Thus, specifically 
with regard to thymos, for example, he observes that not only is thymos 
present in the form of isothymia, but all healthy and stable liberal 
democracies “must permit some degree of safe and domesticated 
megalothymia, even if this runs contrary to the principles they profess 
to believe in.”76 It is simply natural for some people to want to excel 
and be recognized as superior to others rather than just being one of a 
mass of “last men” engaging in “rational consumption.”77 And indeed 
liberal democracies provide several outlets for megalothymia—
business, science and technology, politics (especially foreign policy), 
sports, artistic culture, and so on.78 In this way, then, each of the 
human types receives what is “spiritually due” to it, and the various 
parts of the soul within each of those types receive what is “spiritually 
due” to them. However, Fukuyama does not then explicitly make the 
additional connection between this idea of “spiritual justice”—of 
justice in the soul—and the idea of peace as you have done, although 
surely he would not disagree with putting the matter that way. 
Father Pope, do you have any comments about what I have said? 
And then I would be really quite interested to know what you think 
about it all, Inspector Callahan. 
                                                
75 FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 337. 
76 Id. For further discussion of this point, see id. at 315, 320-21. 
77 Id. at 313-15. For an extended discussion of Nietzsche’s critique of liberal 
democracy as representing not “a synthesis of the morality of the master and the 
morality of the slave” but “an unconditional victory of the slave” resulting in a 
society of “last men” who are “without [c]hests” and “[without] a certain 
horizon, that is, a set of values and beliefs that are accepted absolutely and 
uncritically” within which they can live, see id. at 300-12. 
78 Id. at 315-21. See also id. at 223-34 (discussing the thymotic origins of work 
and the work ethic, including standards of professionalism, and the thymotic 
elements in economic liberalism). 
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II. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: SITTING APART 
AND “PUNKIFYING” OTHERS 
Father Pope: I must confess to wondering about the notion that 
the economic and political arrangements of liberal democracy, as you 
have described them, are completely satisfying to human beings. 
Professor Logie: Well, Fukuyama does ask whether there might 
be some remaining “contradictions” in liberal democracy that make it 
less than completely satisfying to human beings. Here he considers 
challenges from both the “Left” and the “Right” that essentially center 
on the tension between liberty and equality. The challenge from the 
Left is that “the promise of universal, reciprocal recognition remains 
essentially unfulfilled.”79 Using our metaphor of the chairs, I suppose 
one could say that this challenge focuses on differences between 
everyone’s chairs—differences in their height, size, appearance, and 
comfort—and tries to reduce or eliminate those differences. The more 
serious challenge, for Fukuyama, comes from the Right, which rejects 
“the goal of equal recognition itself . . . because human beings are 
inherently unequal.”80 I suppose one could say here, then, that some 
individuals might again seek a throne, with everyone else dispossessed 
of their own chairs and groveling at their feet. However, in the final 
analysis, Fukuyama does not seem overly concerned that either type of 
challenge could defeat the idea of liberal democracy, provided we 
remain clear about what is really at stake.81 But I get the sense that you 
were thinking of something else. 
Father Pope: That’s right. It seems that Fukuyama is basically 
providing a secular justification for liberal democracy. Even assuming 
his teleology is not flawed because God does not intervene in history 
to influence such matters, I question whether secular liberal democracy 
alone can be completely satisfying to human beings. So, I think Hegel-
Kojève may be onto something very important when they say that 
“[t]he Christian God recognizes all human beings universally, 
recognizes their individual human worth and dignity,” although, at 
least as you have described it, they then seem to dismiss Christianity, 
and religion generally, too easily.82 Of course, it may seem paradoxical 
to talk about “recognition” by God, since recognition is associated 
                                                
79 Id. at 289. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 314-15, 336-38. 
82 Supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
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with pride, which is regarded as a sin. However—and without trying to 
solve the knotty problem of the relationship of the psyche to the 
immortal soul83—perhaps it is not so paradoxical on a proper 
understanding of Christian humility, and of the difference between 
unhealthy pride and a healthy sense of self-worth that comes from 
knowing one is valued and loved by God. Thus, there may still be a 
place for a healthy form of thymos in the divine economy. Perhaps we 
should think of it as thymos undergoing a type of transformation in 
which we acknowledge that we have received the world, ourselves, 
and one another, as Gift that is entrusted to us as stewards.84 I may 
want to revisit all this later if there is an opportunity. For now, let me 
just say that it is a great blessing that we live in a system that respects 
and protects religious freedom. 
Professor Hope: So, at least in that formal sense, Father, I suppose 
you could say that liberal democracy might be completely satisfying to 
human beings, because it does allow their “restless hearts” to seek God 
in their own way.85 
Father Pope: In that formal sense, yes, I agree with you. 
Professor Logie: And now, Inspector Callahan—finally—what do 
you think about all this? Doesn’t living in a liberal democracy, and 
                                                
83 Here, Father Pope acknowledges that when we speak about the tripartite soul or 
“spiritual justice,” we are basically talking about the human psyche, and about 
psychological conflict and well-being and its relationship to economic and 
political arrangements, and not necessarily about the immortal soul of 
Christianity. For the Roman Catholic teaching on the soul, see CATECHISM OF 
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH §§ 362-368 (1994, 1997) [hereinafter CATECHISM]. 
84 Cf. 1 Peter 4:10 (New Am. Rev. ed. 2011) (“As each one has received a gift, use 
it to serve one another as good stewards of God’s varied grace.”). 
85 Here Professor Hope has in mind the beginning of Saint Augustine’s 
Confessions:  
 “Great art thou, O Lord, and greatly to be praised; great is thy 
power, and infinite is thy wisdom.” And man desires to praise 
thee, for he is a part of thy creation; he bears his mortality 
about with him and carries the evidence of his sin and the 
proof that thou dost resist the proud. Still he desires to praise 
thee, this man who is only a small part of thy creation. Thou 
hast prompted him, that he should delight to praise thee, for 
thou hast made us for thyself and restless is our heart until it 
comes to rest in thee.  
 THE CONFESSIONS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE Book One, 1.1 (Albert C. 
Outler, trans., 1955) (referencing Ps. 145:3, Ps. 147:5), http://www9. 
georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/ augustine/conf.pdf (emphasis added). For further 
discussion on religion’s place in liberal democracies, see infra note 99. 
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encouraging its spread around the globe, offer a “better way to a better 
world,” as you put it—one with much less conflict and violence—for 
the reasons we have explored?86 
Dirty Harry: Is that it? That’s your big point? You people really 
crack me up. I’ve been listening to you yakking away about your 
grand theories—yak, yak, and more yak. I’m beginning to understand 
why they say that academics live in an “ivory tower.” You sure as hell 
don’t live in the real world, my world, Sorry about the language, 
Father; and I don’t mean you so much anyway because you haven’t 
bought into all this crap uncritically; sorry again. 
But in case you other pointy heads hadn’t noticed, we do live in a 
liberal democracy; and there are a lot of problems. The place is full of 
punks: criminals I have to deal with every day; other losers who 
haven’t done an honest day’s work in their lives but just want a 
handout; unions demanding higher wages and extorting employers, the 
job creators; millions of illegal aliens; “victims” who keep squealing 
for new “rights”; baby killers. And that’s just us. What about the rest 
of the world? What about those countries that aren’t liberal 
democracies? They’re killing each other—Syria anyone? Egypt? 
Yemen? And they’re attacking us as well, like those crazy Muslim 
terrorists did on 9/11/01, or when they stormed our embassies and 
consulates over some stupid movie exactly eleven years later, or when 
they bombed the Boston Marathon in April 2013. Now we’ve got the 
                                                
86 Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis has been subjected to various critiques, 
including Samuel Huntington’s notorious “clash of civilizations” counter-thesis 
(stressing especially the clash between Muslims and non-Muslims). See 
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE 
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996). Although detailed discussion of these 
critiques is beyond the scope of this Article, it should perhaps be noted that 
many of the critics seem to have misunderstood the nuances of Fukuyama’s 
argument and/or to be impatient in failing to take the very long-term view. As 
discussed supra note 74 and accompanying text, Fukuyama still seems to adhere 
to his “end of history” thesis despite the dramatic events that have occurred 
during the quarter century since he first articulated it. Fukuyama himself now 
sees the greatest danger to the future of liberal democracy in biotechnological 
advances that might make it possible for humans to control their own evolution 
and thus alter what it means to be a human being. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, 
OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
REVOLUTION (2002). Although an architect of neoconservatism, and at one time 
a supporter of the Bush Administration’s neoconservative agenda, Fukuyama 
subsequently distanced himself from that agenda. See Francis Fukuyama, After 
Neoconservatism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., (Feb. 19, 2006), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2006/02/19/magazine/neo.html?ex&_r=0. 
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ISIS crazies too. And then, even though liberal democracies may not 
fight one another, we have to go and sort them out. Iraq anyone? 
Afghanistan? Not to mention the Democrats and other liberal types 
like you, who go all weak at the knees and fall over themselves to 
molly coddle all of them. What a bunch of punks! 
So I see lots of problems, lots of conflicts and divisions, and lots of 
punks. So what’s all this “Kumbaya” peace and harmony, spiritual 
justice, and God knows what else, at the “end of history” crap? Give 
me a break. 
Professor Logie (somewhat taken aback at the forcefulness and 
passion of Dirty Harry’s response and not quite sure whether he has 
just been called a punk): Well, there’s definitely a lot there, and I’m 
sorry you’re upset that we haven’t been much help. Fukuyama is 
certainly aware of the problems, conflicts, and divisions you mention, 
and he tries to give us a way to think about them within the framework 
of his general thesis. 
With regard to liberal democracies themselves, in addition to 
acknowledging the many social problems that exist, including crime,87 
Fukuyama wants us to understand how the kinds of conflicts and 
divisions you mention are often (not always, to be sure) thymotic 
conflicts involving the desire for recognition, in addition to being, or 
sometimes even instead of being, a clash of economic interests 
implicating the desiring part of the soul.88 Thus, thymos may operate 
autonomously or as “an ally of desire,”89 depending on the type of 
claim and conflict involved. He says, for example, that “[v]irtually the 
entire civil liberties and civil rights agendas, while having certain 
economic components, are essentially thymotic contests over 
recognition of competing understandings of justice and human 
dignity.”90 
                                                
87 See FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 288 (“Liberal democracies are doubtless 
plagued by a host of problems like unemployment, pollution, drugs, crime, and 
the like”). 
88 For examples, see id. at 171-72 (feminism and racism), 172-74 (wage claims 
and economic justice), 176 (abortion, racism, poverty, and civil liberties and 
civil rights generally), 187 (abortion rights, school prayer, freedom of speech), 
190 (anti-abortion protests, animal rights advocacy), 203-04 (civil rights, right to 
vote), and 277-78 (immigration). See also supra note 79 and accompanying text 
(discussing the challenge to liberal democracy from the “Left”). 
89 FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 177. 
90 Id. at 176. 
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Thymos is involved in so much human conflict because “[i]n a 
world of thymotic moral selves, they will be constantly disagreeing 
and arguing and growing angry with one another over a host of 
questions, large and small.”91 This means that the “factions” that 
concerned Founders such as Madison “result not just from the clash 
between the desiring parts of different men’s souls (i.e., economic 
interests) but between their thymotic parts as well.”92 We could say, 
therefore, that these kinds of thymotic conflicts are present-day 
instances of the continuing “struggle for recognition” within liberal 
democracies themselves.93 
Also, if I may say so, your examples of thymotic conflict between 
the citizens of liberal democracies seem a little tendentious and one-
sided. They imply that the sources of conflict are provocations from 
the “Left.” Wouldn’t it be more balanced to acknowledge that “it takes 
two to tango” and that many of these conflicts are provoked, or also 
provoked, by over-reaching megalothymia on the “Right”—often 
combined with excessive desire, that is, greed? For example, what 
about the “masters of the universe” who played such a significant part 
in the global financial meltdown from which we are still recovering,94 
or business owners who exploit their workers or are reckless about the 
safety of their products or about the harm to our environment caused 
by their hubris, or politicians who mislead us into futile foreign wars 
by their hubris, or mysogynistic or homophobic religious fanatics who 
try to force their oppressive morality on women or gays? What about 
our growing police state? Not to mention the heartless Republicans 
and Ayn Rand types who don’t seem to care about anyone else. 
                                                
91 Id. at 181-82. 
92 Id. at 187. For further discussion of the Founders, see id. at 203-04. 
93 Of course, the health, and perhaps even the very survival, of liberal democracies 
depend on their citizens’ “irrational recognition” in some important respects. See 
supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (virtues); FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, 
at 218-19, 222 (civil associations and communities), 229-34 (work ethic and its 
supporting communities), 215, 219, 222 (pride in liberal democracy); see also 
supra note 78 and accompanying text (outlets for megalothymia). For my own 
attempt to use ideas derived from the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre to suggest 
a link between the health of modern liberal democracies and the pursuit of 
excellence and virtue in communities of professional practice, see Mark L. 
Jones, Fisherman Jack: Living in “Juropolis”—The Fishing Village of the Law, 
66 MERCER L. REV. 485 (2015). 
94 See generally SATYAJIT DAS, EXTREME MONEY: MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE 
AND THE CULT OF RISK (2011). 
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I’m sorry; now I really am getting my knickers in a tangle. It seems 
like our thymos is definitely showing, doesn’t it?95 I need to regain my 
philosophical composure. (Professor Logie takes a deep breath). Of 
course, these kinds of political disputes and social divisions in stable 
liberal democracies rarely generate large-scale physical violence. By 
contrast, in those societies which are not yet stable liberal 
democracies, that is, that are not yet part of the “post-historical world,” 
but are still “stuck in history,” as Fukuyama puts it,96 often such 
conflicts do result in large-scale violence—and many tragic deaths—as 
these societies tear themselves apart, or fight with one another, or do 
both simultaneously; and liberal democracies may be dragged into the 
conflicts too. The reasons are varied but two of the major ones are 
religion and nationalism, both of which are manifestations of the 
culture of a people97 and involve “irrational” forms of thymos and 
“irrational recognition.”98 Although neither one of these factors is 
“inherently incompatible” with liberal democracy and international 
peace, because both can be “defanged” and become tolerant,99 each is 
                                                
95 Dirty Harry and Professor Logie’s use of stereotyping and highly derogatory 
language in characterizing those groups they find distasteful is symptomatic of 
the apparent deterioration in the quality of our political conversation in the 
United States in recent years and of the deep political, economic, and religious 
divisions that are reflected in this deteriorated conversation. See Citizenship and 
Civility in a Divided Democracy: Political, Religious, and Legal Concerns—A 
Symposium of the Mercer Law Review, 63 MERCER L. REV. 793 (2012) 
(providing one example, among many, of an effort to address this problem). 
96 FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 276-77. 
97 Id. at 212-14. 
98 Id. at xix, 207, 234, 266. For Fukuyama’s discussion of several “cultural” 
factors that can impede the transition to liberal democracy, see id. at 212-19; see 
also Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 22 
(1997) (exploring the distinctions between liberalism and democracy); Robert 
Cooper, Why We Still Need Empires, OBSERVER (April 7, 2002), 
http://www.theguardian.com/observer/worldview/story/0,11581,680117,00.html 
(calling for a new “postmodern imperialism” in a world made up of postmodern 
states, modern states, and pre-modern states). On the provocative question 
regarding the extent to which the United States is (not yet) part of the “post-
historical” world, see Francis Fukuyama, The History at the End of History, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 3, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/ 
apr/03/thehistoryattheendofhist. 
99 See FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 216, 270-71 (religion), 215, 268-75 
(nationalism). For the argument that liberal democracy, with its freedom of 
conscience, pluralistic toleration of a diversity of beliefs, and separation of 
religion and political power, is the best political arrangement for “defanging” 
religion, see SACKS, supra note 6, at 228-30; see also JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & 
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also viciously capable of revealing the “dark side” of thymos.100 In 
Fukuyama’s sobering words “[o]nly thymos, searching for ‘justice,’ is 
capable of true fanaticism, obsession, and hatred.”101 We see the 
potential in the Islamic world today.102 
                                                                                                               
ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, GOD IS BACK: HOW THE GLOBAL REVIVAL OF FAITH 
IS CHANGING THE WORLD 367-73 (2009) (extolling the American “solution” 
embodied in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). Given the current 
conditions in today’s world, however, Sacks considers that it is now imperative 
to grapple with the theology that led to religious conflicts in the first place:  
As Jews, Christians, and Muslims, we have to be prepared to ask 
the most uncomfortable questions. Does the God of Abraham want 
his disciples to kill for his sake? Does he demand human sacrifice? 
Does he rejoice in holy war? Does he want us to hate our enemies 
and terrorize unbelievers? Have we read our sacred texts correctly? 
What is God saying to us, here, now?  
SACKS, supra note 6, at 19-23. 
100 FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 181-82, 201, 214, 255-56, 259, 266-68 
(discussing the replacement of dynastic and religious imperialism by 
nationalistic imperialism). 
101 Id. at 214. 
102 For Europe’s own historical excesses, see id. at 259-60, 271 (religion), 266-68, 
330-32 (nationalism); see also id. at 268-75 (potential for renewed nationalist 
excesses in Europe and elsewhere). For an overview of religiously motivated 
violence and “altruistic evil” in our own time and possible responses, see 
SACKS, supra note 6, at 3-26. For further extended discussion of the challenges 
posed by antagonisms and conflicts rooted in religion in our own time (including 
both literal wars and culture wars) and various responses, see generally 
MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 99, at 297-367. Sacks considers 
that pathological dualism and violence have marked the relationship of the three 
Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) for so much of their 
history because “[b]uilt into their self-definitions are a series of sibling rivalries 
drawn from the early narratives of the Hebrew Bible” that are “fraught with 
mimetic desire . . . for the same thing, Abraham’s promise [and] the most 
precious gift of all: God’s paternal love.” SACKS, supra note 6, at 98-102. For 
Sacks’ elaboration of these self-definitions, see id. at 90-98. For earlier 
discussion of sibling rivalry and pathological dualism, see supra notes 60, 63 
respectively.  
  Sacks offers a radical re-reading of the relevant narratives from Genesis 
(Cain and Abel, Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Esau, Joseph and his brothers, 
Rachel and Leah), identifying counter-narratives that reject the various elements 
of pathological dualism and progressively overcome sibling rivalry, culminating 
in reconciliation among siblings and their realization that mimetic desire is 
misconceived because they each have their own blessing and are loved by God 
for what and who they are. SACKS, supra note 6, at 102-73. For Sacks’ 
discussion of what else is needed, in addition to such re-interpretation, for Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims (and also different groupings within each faith) to live 
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Dirty Harry: Like I said, there are punks everywhere—in liberal 
democracies and in other countries—and it seems you agree with me. 
And the only way I know to deal with punks is to use force and 
violence, physical or otherwise. So, I still don’t see a better way—even 
after all your yakking. Do you always talk so much and say so little? 
III. UNDERSTANDING ONE ANOTHER: SITTING TOGETHER AND 
“RECOGNIZING” OTHERS—SPIRITUAL JUSTICE PART TWO 
Professor Hope: May I make a suggestion based on something we 
have already talked about. I wonder if the problem is that you are too 
easily labeling those you regard as antagonists as just “punks.” Before 
you conclude that they are punks, shouldn’t you at least listen to them, 
and try to hear what they are saying or asking for? Instead of—or at 
least before—you “rope an’ throw an’ brand ‘em,” as one might say, 
shouldn’t you “try to understand ‘em”? (Dirty Harry smiles on being 
reminded of one of his favorite T.V. shows from his youth: 
“Rawhide”103). In other words, shouldn’t understanding precede 
judgment and any decision or any action flowing from it? 
Aren’t we all familiar with the experience that listening to 
someone, and being listened to, can help defuse conflict? After all— 
                                                                                                               
together in peace, and of how these additional elements also find warrant in 
interpretations of the Hebrew Bible, see id. at 177-88 (loving the stranger 
through a role reversal that imagines oneself as, and puts oneself in the place of, 
the Other), 189-206 (honoring human commonalities by honoring the dignity of 
every Other as the image and likeness of God, as well as human diversity by 
honoring differences among persons and cultures and accepting that their 
relationship with God may be different from one’s own), 207-19 (rejecting 
fundamentalism and re-interpreting “hard texts” in love in the direction of 
spiritual maximalism and military minimalism in accordance with traditional 
rules of interpretation and structures of authority), 220-37 (relinquishing 
political power and the imposition of religious truth by force, especially through 
“apocalyptic politics,” relying instead on exerting influence through strength of 
argument and example, preferably in liberal democracy that makes space for 
difference), 238-51 (letting go of blame, hate, and the desire for revenge, instead 
achieving freedom by forgiving past wrongs and taking responsibility for 
building a better future), 252-67 (fostering cooperation among Jews, Christians, 
and Muslims to recover, defend, and implement the humanizing values of 
Abrahamic monotheism, to apply the principle of reciprocal altruism in their 
mutual relations, and to reject the altruistic evil of terrorism). 
103 See Frankie Laine—Rawhide Lyrics, COWBOYLYRICS.COM, http://www. 
cowboylyrics.com/lyrics/laine-frankie/rawhide-12547.html (last visited Feb. 15, 
2016) (lyrics to theme song); Frankie Laine, Rawhide, YOUTUBE (July 10, 
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5upqYOuH0jQ (theme song). 
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actually, I don’t know about you, I suppose, and maybe you’re 
different—but speaking for myself anyway: When I am in an 
argument, if I feel I am really being listened to and taken seriously, 
and that I am being valued and respected at least in this regard, then I 
begin to feel less angry. But the opposite is true if I feel I am not being 
listened to and taken seriously; then I become more frustrated and 
indignant because I feel disrespected. I bet that anyone who is married 
or in another type of close relationship knows exactly what I mean. 
And if I and the other person both feel that we are listening to and 
taking one other seriously, doesn’t that in turn make our underlying 
conflict easier to deal with as well? Isn’t it then easier to find a 
mutually acceptable solution, or at least to agree to disagree on a more 
amicable basis? 
Well, if this is true—and accepting, for the sake of argument, that 
it is—what is going on here psychologically? Don’t our feelings of 
frustration, humiliation, and resentment, when we feel disvalued and 
treated dismissively, and of support, self-worth, and goodwill, when 
we feel valued and taken seriously, have their seat in the thymotic part 
of the soul? Moreover, isn’t taking another person seriously by truly 
listening to them another way to recognize that person? Indeed, don’t 
our “struggles for recognition” involve, at least initially, the struggle to 
be heard and to be understood? First, we struggle to have our claims 
heard and understood, to be “recognized” in this procedural sense; 
then we continue to struggle to persuade others that our claims should 
be accepted on the merits, and thus “recognized” in this second, 
substantive sense. 
And, going back to what we were discussing earlier about 
justice104: If we are truly heard and understood—if we are 
“recognized” in the first, procedural sense—isn’t that another 
important aspect of justice? Isn’t it part of giving someone their “due,” 
not just that they have a chair to sit in and from which they can speak 
in the conversation but that they are given a proper hearing by others 
sitting in their own chairs? By contrast, isn’t a refusal to listen and to 
try to understand another’s point of view a refusal to “recognize” them 
and a denial of justice by not giving them their “due”? Isn’t it, in fact, 
a type of megalothymia, an assertion of superiority, to say in effect: 
“Why should I listen to you; you are just a “fill in the blank (inferior 
lazy Black person, Muslim, benighted religious bigot)” whereas I am a 
“fill in the blank (superior hard-working White person, Christian, 
                                                
104 See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. 
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member of the enlightened intelligentsia)”? But if, instead, I am able 
to overcome my irrational pride and say, with humility: “You are 
worthy of being listened to,” then isn’t this an additional 
acknowledgement of isothymia? And doesn’t this type of “procedural 
justice” therefore also represent, and indeed bring about, a 
redistribution of thymotic value from me to you? Consequently isn’t 
this yet another way in which we can achieve “spiritual justice” 
between, and within, our two souls? And doesn’t this help to explain 
why, when we do this to and for each other, we have the more 
positive—or, one could say, more “peaceful” or harmonious—feelings 
we just talked about? And why, when we do not do this to and for each 
other, the opposite is true and we have the negative, more “hostile” or 
disharmonious feelings instead? In other words, isn’t this another 
important aspect of “No peace without justice”? 
Moreover, isn’t this part of the genius behind the Rule of Law? 
Don’t we help to defuse anger and disarm conflict that might 
otherwise result in violence by giving people their “day in court” when 
they can be assured of being heard in accordance with the rituals and 
forms of the law? So, in the Anglo-American legal tradition we say 
that hearing the other side (audi alteram partem) is part of “natural 
justice.”105 But, of course, when the judge does “procedural justice” by 
listening to and trying to understand each side of the case in the legal 
conversation, it does not guarantee, during the continuing struggle by 
the parties to have their claims accepted, that there will in fact be a just 
outcome on the merits. Similarly, when we do “procedural justice” by 
listening to and trying to understand one another in our particular 
conversations, whatever they may be (political, religious, personal, and 
so forth), it also does not guarantee, during the continuing struggle to 
have our claims accepted, that the outcome will be just. However, just 
as in the law, doesn’t such listening and understanding make it much 
more likely both that the outcome is in fact a just one and, perhaps 
even more important, that we will both agree that it is just—that our 
respective chairs are of appropriate relative height, size, appearance, 
and comfort?106 Furthermore, if the outcome is indeed just and agreed 
                                                
105 Audi Alteram Partem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ONLINE, (2d ed. 1910), 
http://thelawdictionary.org/audi-alteram-partem/; H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 160 (3d ed. 2012) (part of principles of Natural Justice). 
106 On “justice” in the law, see ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: 
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 335 (1993) (“Doing justice to the 
parties that appear before one means honoring the rights and enforcing the duties 
that the law assigns them.”). On agreement that the outcome is a just one, see id. 
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to be so, so that each receives and is acknowledged to have received 
their “due” on the merits, then won’t this achieve even more 
“spiritual” justice and peace between and within our souls? But my 
main focus here is on the importance of doing justice by listening and 
trying to understand. 
Dirty Harry: Great: more crap about “spiritual justice” He talks a 
lot (gesturing towards Professor Logie), and you ask a lot of 
questions, and neither of you seems to have a clue. So, tell me—just 
exactly why should I waste my time “doing justice” to punks by 
listening to them and trying to understand them? I don’t need to listen 
to them; I already know they’re punks. “Spiritual justice” for punks! 
Whatever next? Oh yeah, I know—let’s give the criminal punks lots of 
rights and protections under your precious “Rule of Law” and no 
rights and protections to the victims. By the way, that’s where I come 
in; I give them “justice” alright—I give ‘em a .44 Magnum. Now 
that’s justice. Oh, and in case you’re wondering about it, no, I don’t 
feel any great need to get “spiritual justice” and “peace” in my own 
“soul” because some other kind of punk I disagree with has 
“recognized” me by listening to me and trying to understand me. 
Professor Hope: Putting the criminal justice system aside—
although I do think it might be interesting to know just exactly how 
people come to be criminals in the first place—you continue to resist 
the idea that you should first try to listen and understand someone you 
disagree with, because otherwise you are pre-judging, or judging 
without understanding. You continue to assume that the other person is 
just a “punk.” I could, of course, suggest that you might appear to be 
just a punk to that other person as well, but that probably wouldn’t get 
us very far. Let’s see if there is a way for you to see things differently, 
to see that once you have listened and tried to understand, then the 
other person really might not seem to be such a punk after all. Perhaps 
an example or a little exercise might help get us started. And, since we 
have already mentioned the law—Professor Roe would you tell 
Inspector Callahan about the animal trials you talked about at the 
conference today. 
Professor Roe: I would be happy to. It’s one of my favorite 
subjects. Let me begin by describing an animal trial that took place in 
early sixteenth century France. One of the scholars who have studied 
                                                                                                               
at 340-42 (discussing the judicial statesmanship that tries to create agreement 
and preserve political fraternity between the parties through the judge’s 
“rationalizing” and “commensurating” opinion even though the conflict between 
the parties may involve “incommensurable” values). 
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these sorts of trials, William Ewald, gives a good description of the 
trial in an article he wrote in 1995:107 
In 1522 some rats were placed on trial before the 
ecclesiastical court in Autun. They were charged with a 
felony: specifically, the crime of having eaten and wantonly 
destroyed some barley crops in the jurisdiction. A formal 
complaint against “some rats of the diocese” was presented 
to the bishop’s vicar, who thereupon cited the culprits to 
appear on a day certain, and who appointed a local jurist, 
Barthélémy Chassenée . . . to defend them. Chassenée, then 
forty-two, was known for his learning, but not yet famous; 
the trial of the rats of Autun was to establish his reputation, 
and launch a distinguished career in the law. 
When his clients failed to appear in court, Chassenée 
resorted to procedural arguments. His first tactic was to 
invoke the notion of fair process, and specifically to 
challenge the original writ for having failed to give the rats 
due notice. The defendants, he pointed out, were dispersed 
over a large tract of countryside, and lived in many villages; 
a single summons was inadequate to notify them all. 
Moreover, the summons was addressed only to some of the 
rats of the diocese; but technically it should have been 
addressed to them all. 
Chassenée was successful in his argument, and the court 
ordered a second summons to be read from the pulpit of 
every local parish church; this second summons now 
correctly addressed all the local rats, without exception. But 
on the appointed day the rats again failed to appear. 
Chassenée now made a second argument. His clients, he 
reminded the court, were widely dispersed; they needed to 
make preparations for a great migration, and those 
preparations would take time. The court once again 
conceded the reasonableness of the argument, and granted a 
further delay in the proceedings. When the rats a third time 
failed to appear, Chassenée was ready with a third argument. 
The first two arguments had relied on the idea of procedural 
                                                
107 William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889 (1995), partially reprinted in VIVIAN GROSSWALD 
CURRAN, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 59-78 (2002). Ewald 
draws substantially upon two earlier studies of animal trials. See EDWARD P. 
EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF 
ANIMALS (1906); Walter Woodburn Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of 
Animals and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modern Times, 64 U. PA. 
L. REV. 696 (1916). 
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fairness; the third treated the rats as a class of persons who 
were entitled to equal treatment under the law. He addressed 
the court at length, and successfully demonstrated that, if a 
person is cited to appear at a place to which he cannot come 
in safety, he may lawfully refuse to obey the writ. And a 
journey to court would entail serious perils for his clients. 
They were notoriously unpopular in the region; and 
furthermore they were rightly afraid of their natural enemies, 
the cats. Moreover (he pointed out to the court) the cats 
could hardly be regarded as neutral in this dispute; for they 
belonged to the plaintiffs. He accordingly demanded that the 
plaintiffs be enjoined by the court, under the threat of severe 
penalties, to restrain their cats, and prevent them from 
frightening his clients. The court again found this argument 
compelling; but now the plaintiffs seem to have come to the 
end of their patience. They demurred to the motion; the 
court, unable to settle on the correct period within which the 
rats must appear, adjourned on the question sine die, and 
judgment for the rats was granted by default.108 
Dirty Harry: Well, if that ain’t the craziest, damnedest thing I 
ever heard (sorry again Father)! I thought these two were pretty weird 
(gesturing towards Professor Logie and Professor Hope), but that’s 
not just weird; it’s insane. (After a pause) Okay, I get it; you’re 
kidding me, right? It’s a joke. 
Professor Roe: No, it’s no joke. The trial really happened, and 
apparently it really did establish Chassenée’s reputation as a criminal 
defense attorney.109 Moreover, over the course of his career it seems 
that Chassenée worked on several other cases involving animal 
prosecutions.110 And ten years after the trial in Autun he wrote a 
treatise about putting insects on trial that was reprinted several times in 
which he “discusses the full range of issues that can have been 
expected to arise during a trial of ‘insect animals’: the jurisdiction of 
the lay and ecclesiastical courts, the proper form of the complaint, the 
issues of notice and of adequate representation by counsel, the 
procedures to be followed at trial, and the passing and execution of 
sentences.”111 
                                                
108 Ewald, supra note 107, at 59-61. 
109 Id. at 61. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
2016 Beyond Punks in Empty Chairs 349 
As the need to reprint Chassenée’s book suggests, he wasn’t alone. 
In fact, Ewald tells us that “[f]rom the ninth century to the nineteenth, 
in Western Europe, there are over two hundred well-recorded cases of 
trials of animals, with the majority falling in the fifteenth, sixteenth, 
and seventeenth centuries;” and those were just the recorded cases—
there were doubtless many more.112 As Ewald explains: 
The animals known to have been placed on trial during 
this period include: asses, beetles, bloodsuckers, bulls, 
caterpillars, chickens, cockchafers, cows, dogs, dolphins, 
eels, field mice, flies, goats, grasshoppers, horses, locusts, 
mice, moles, pigeons, pigs, rats, serpents, sheep, slugs, 
snails, termites, weevils, wolves, worms, and miscellaneous 
vermin.113 
As a general rule, wild animals were tried in the ecclesiastical 
courts and domestic animals were tried in the ordinary criminal courts. 
When vermin like rats were tried, because they were destroying crops 
for example, the prosecution sought to deter them by seeking the 
spiritual remedy of anathema or excommunication to eliminate the 
infestation.114 But when domestic animals were tried because they had 
killed someone, the prosecution sought to condemn and punish the 
animal by seeking the temporal remedy of execution, sometimes 
preceded by imprisonment.115 And occasionally the animals won, like 
the rats of Autun effectively did in 1521; or like the snout beetles 
infesting the plaintiff’s vineyards in St. Julien did in1546 when the 
court issued a proclamation, before the case ever got to trial, observing 
that the fruits of the earth were intended for insects as well as humans 
and that it would be better for the plaintiffs “to implore the mercy of 
heaven, and to seek pardon for their sins, than to proceed rashly 
against the beetles;”116 or like the six piglets did in Savigny-sur-Etang 
                                                
112 Id. at 64. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 64-65. 
116 Id. at 63. The infestation then disappeared. When it returned in 1587, and the 
beetles were brought to trial, the plaintiffs proposed a compromise, setting aside 
a field for the beetles in perpetuity and agreeing that “the insects had a legal 
right to life, and to an adequate share of the earth’s bounty.” However, the 
attorneys for the beetles rejected the offer because the land was in fact barren 
and because they objected to various rights over the land reserved by the 
plaintiffs, although it seems that some bugs or rats ate the final pages of the 
extensive court records, so the final outcome is unknown. Id. at 63-64. 
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in 1457, when they were acquitted of the crime of murdering and 
partly devouring an infant although their sow mother had been found 
guilty of the crime and hanged a month earlier.117 
Dirty Harry: And I thought giving all those “due process” rights 
to criminal punks was bad enough. Now you’re telling me they used to 
give the same kinds of rights to animals as well. Next thing you’ll be 
telling me they had to “Mirandize” them when they got arrested. I 
guess they must have had a bunch of liberals running around then too. 
Professor Roe: I don’t know about that, Inspector. Some of the 
executions were pretty gruesome, and sometimes the animal was 
tortured beforehand.118 And let’s not forget that heretics were also 
being executed during the same time period as the cases involving the 
rats, the beetles, and the piglets—and not necessarily after getting a 
hearing.119 
Dirty Harry: So, let me get this straight. They put some animals 
on trial, with lots of due process protections, but some humans didn’t 
even get a trial before they were burned at the stake or whatever 
because they didn’t believe right. And then, even though they’d been 
real nice to the animals by giving them a trial, when they did punish 
them, they were often real cruel. Now that doesn’t make much sense, 
does it? Sounds like a lot of superstitious and primitive medieval 
mumbo-jumbo to me. I’d say they must have been real punks. 
Father Pope: Before you continue, let me just make it clear that 
the Church doesn’t execute heretics any more, and we don’t put 
animals on trial either—just in case you were wondering. 
Professor Roe: Well Inspector, that’s the sixty-four-dollar 
question, isn’t it: Just what were they thinking? Of course, we can 
never really know, can we, because they are long dead and the 
historical materials and what we can infer from them are limited. 
However, the important thing is to try. We must try to enter their point 
of view, their worldview, to see things through their eyes, not ours. 
Only in this way can we hope to “make sense” of what might seem 
like “nonsense” to us.120 To do this we must first acknowledge our 
                                                
117 Id. at 65. The piglets were acquitted “[b]ecause of their youth, because their 
mother had set a bad example, and because the evidence was not sufficient to 
convict.” Id. 
118 Id. at 65, 72. 
119 See id. at 62-63 (discussing Chassenée’s own involvement in such an episode 
involving the extirpation of Waldenses in the villages of Cabrières and Merindol 
in 1540-41). 
120 See id. at 70 (identifying the problem as being “to make sense” of things). 
2016 Beyond Punks in Empty Chairs 351 
own situatedness in a particular time and place and set of 
circumstances,121 how our “perceptual prisms” and “substructural 
categorizations” shape our perceptions and understanding,122 and how 
those perceptions and that understanding are also influenced by many 
different kinds of cognitive biases.123 Once we have done this, which 
of course requires a significant degree of epistemological humility,124 
we are then in a better position to try to understand what at first might 
seem so strange, unfamiliar, or even absurd to us, as the animal trials 
undoubtedly do, by trying to see matters through the prisms and 
categorizations of the culture that produced those trials. Karen 
                                                
121 See, e.g., Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative 
Law, 26 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 411 (1985), partially reprinted in VICKI C. 
JACKSON & MARK V. TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 151, 
186 (1999) (emphasizing the importance, in the context of comparative law, of 
becoming aware of, and making the effort to transcend, “subjectivity, . . . the 
observer’s perspective and experience,” that is an inevitable part of growing up 
in a particular culture). For a good sense of the situatedness of modernity and of 
its mechanistic and reductionist Cartesian-Newtonian worldview, see Fritjof 
Capra, Turning Point: A Science of Living Systems, http://www.earthand 
spiritcenter.org/assets/Meditation%203%20readings%20fall%202015/3-2%20 
Turning%20PointA%20Science%20of%20Living%20Systems%20-%20Fritjof 
%20Capra.pdf (discussing the emergence of a new, ecological and holistic 
worldview involving a systems approach to the understanding of living 
biological and social systems); see also RICHARD TARNAS, COSMOS AND 
PSYCHE 16-25 (2006) (discussing the trajectory of human consciousness from 
the participating consciousness of the primal worldview to the differentiated and 
alienated consciousness of the Cartesian-Newtonian worldview); Narvaez, 
Neurobiology, supra note 60, at 8 (discussing “[d]etached [m]orality in Western 
[c]ivilization”). 
122 Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in 
U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43 (1998), partially reprinted in 
VIVIAN GROSSWALD CURRAN, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 40-
41 (2002) (discussing “cultural immersion” in comparative law).  
123 See ANDREW NEWBERG & MARK WALDMAN, WHY WE BELIEVE WHAT WE 
BELIEVE: UNCOVERING OUR BIOLOGICAL NEED FOR MEANING, 
SPIRITUALITY, AND TRUTH 253-58 (2006) (identifying twenty-seven “cognitive 
biases” that represent various “assumptions, generalizations, oversights, and 
mistakes” in our perceptions and interpretations of perceptual information 
during the “reconstruction of reality [that] is the foundation from which we 
construct all our beliefs about the world”). 
124 See, e.g., DINESH D’SOUZA, WHAT’S SO GREAT ABOUT CHRISTIANITY? 167-
78 (2007) (chapter entitled The World Beyond Our Senses: Kant and the Limits 
of Reason); RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND: 
UNDERSTANDING THE IDEAS THAT HAVE SHAPED OUR WORLD VIEW 395-
402 (1991) (discussing postmodernism). 
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Armstrong would call this expansion of our moral imagination the 
“science of compassion”125 and say that it also requires us to apply the 
same “principle of charity” applicable to the translation of texts written 
in a foreign language, that is, “when we are confronted with discourse 
that is strange to us, we seek an ‘interpretation which, in the light of 
what it knows of the facts, will maximise truth among the sentences of 
the corpus.’”126 
Professor Hope: And comparatists like Vivian Curran who do 
comparative law and try to understand foreign legal cultures would 
call it “cultural immersion.127 They would also agree with the analogy 
to language—more than just an analogy in fact, because comparative 
law often requires working with foreign languages—and point out that 
the challenge is essentially one of translation. 
Can we ever fully succeed at this? Of course not—as the well-
known saying goes, something is always “lost in translation.” Thus 
“the comparatist will fail to grasp a foreign legal culture completely 
from within.”128 But that doesn’t mean we should not try to come as 
close as we can by “trying to understand foreign legal cultures in an 
untranslated form; i.e., through the prisms that shape perceptions in the 
target legal culture.”129 
                                                
125 See ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 116-17 (describing the “‘science of 
compassion’ that should characterize the work of a religious historian” as “a 
method of acquiring ‘knowledge’ (Latin: scientia) by entering in a scholarly, 
empathetic way into the historical period that is being researched” and thereby 
“mak[ing] place for the other”). Armstrong takes the phrase “science of 
compassion” from Louis Massignon, Les Nusayris, in L’ELABORATION DE L’ 
ISLAM (Claude Cahen, ed. 1961). Id. at 207 n.1. 
126 Id. at 138-39 (quoting N.L. Wilson, in IAN HACKING, WHY DOES LANGUAGE 
MATTER TO PHILOSOPHY? 148 (1975)). 
127 Curran, supra note 122, at 38-41. 
128 Id. at 41. 
129 Id. at 40. Curran elaborates as follows:  
 The immersion approach rejects the absolutist mentality. It 
contemplates a slow pushing against cultural barriers towards 
an ideal of mutual comprehension, a striving to approach 
comprehension, and a recognition that some distances will 
remain. Rather than failure, it implies the need to accept that 
others have different truths. The more deeply one gains 
insights into the particularities of foreign legal cultures, 
influenced by the flavors of each country’s habits, history, 
language, preoccupations, and social circumstances, the more 
aware the comparatist becomes of irreducible incomparables.  
Id. at 123. 
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And we do need to make this kind of effort to understand the 
Other—whether that Other is something “foreign” among our own 
ancestors, such as the animal trials, or something “foreign” among 
people in another part of the world, such as Islam, or even something 
that seems “foreign” to us among people in our own country, such as 
an opponent’s position on same-sex marriage or abortion.130 Moreover, 
with immigration from other countries, we encounter more and more 
“foreign” things from other parts of the world among people in this 
country as well. Of course, when we make the effort to understand 
other people who are alive today, we have a great advantage in that we 
can actually talk to them in person. 
Dirty Harry: Why do I get the feeling that you are ganging up on 
me? But, you see, that’s where you’ve lost me. Why should I make this 
kind of effort to understand “punks”? 
Professor Hope: Because, as I said before, once you have listened 
and tried to understand, then the other person really might not seem to 
be such a “punk” after all. 
Professor Roe: Let’s go back to the animal trials again. 
Remember, our challenge is to try to “make sense” of what might 
seem to us to be “nonsense.” And let’s assume, with Fukuyama, that 
human nature and fundamental cognitive capacities are basically the 
same whatever the time period or place, even though they will be 
modulated in distinctive cultural patterns—for example, some cultures 
may be highly religious, while others may not be, as in the case of 
                                                
130 Regarding the similarities in trying to understand the “foreign” Other in these 
different contexts, Curran explains:  
 Since accepting the idea of human plurality and difference 
also applies to differences within legal cultures, the obstacles 
to successful immersion and to successful comparison are 
different in degree, but not in kind, among different 
communities within a single nation’s legal culture, and among 
legal cultures of different nations. Comparative law, when 
conducted effectively, should thus be an instructive model for 
all legal analysis.  
 Id. See also KRONMAN, supra note 106, at 93-101 (discussing the value of 
“political fraternity” and defining it as “a kind of statesmanship in pianissimo” 
whereby every member of the political community displays an attitude of 
“sympathetic detachment,” meaning that, especially where the alternatives 
are incommensurable, they will endeavor “to place [themselves] imaginatively 
in the position of others and to entertain their concerns in the same affirmative 
spirit they do, while remaining uncommitted to the values and beliefs that give 
these concerns their force” yet also being open to revising their preliminary 
views and making a more informed choice among the alternatives). 
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modern Europe.131 Now, clearly the participants themselves—lawyers 
like Chassenée, for example—did not consider that the animal trials, or 
even the trials or execution of heretics, were “nonsense.” Such things 
made perfect “sense” to them; and we should assume, applying the 
“principle of charity,” that they had “good reasons” for doing what 
they did—that doing these things seemed “reasonable” to them within 
their worldview. We may think that they were not good reasons, or 
even that they were in fact very bad reasons, but that is another issue. 
That has to do with judgment. 
The point is that, before we reach a judgment about the worth of 
the animal trials and about the views and beliefs of the participants, we 
should first try to understand those practices and those views and 
beliefs from within. We should try to grasp their reasons and the 
worldview that informs them. Otherwise we risk an “unwarranted 
imposition of judgment emanating from a certainty of possessing 
objective truth.”132 And we don’t want to do that; instead, we want to 
reach an “informed” judgment. But we can only do that, if we first 
understand. Then, once we understand, we may change our original 
view of the matter; or maybe we won’t. As Curran says, we still have 
to “struggle over whether and when normative judgments are 
applicable or desirable.”133 
Dirty Harry: So, you’re saying they still might be “punks.” 
                                                
131 See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing “a trans-historical concept 
of man”); see also ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 138 (maintaining that “when 
making an effort to understand something strange and alien to you, it is 
important to assume that the speaker shares the same human nature as 
yourself”). 
132 Curran, supra note 122, at 121. 
133  And then, of course, there is the vexing question regarding the normative 
standards that will form the basis of judgment. Regarding the relationship 
between cultural immersion (i.e., understanding) and judgment, Curran offers 
the following insights: 
 There are no theoretical formulas for engaging in both 
simultaneously. The answer, if one can call it an answer, lies 
in what Nussbaum refers to as natural human practices of 
compassion and ethical commitment. If the latter are practiced 
in a context of cultural immersion, perhaps the resulting 
judgments can better avoid or mitigate some of the excesses 
that historically have been associated with a certainty of 
possessing truth, while also avoiding an abdication of political 
action on behalf of oppressed minorities. 
Id. at 122 (referencing Martha Nussbaum, Valuing Values: A Case for 
Reasoned Commitment, 6 YALE J.L. & HUM. 197 (1994)). 
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Professor Roe: Well, if you insist on putting it in those terms, yes, 
I suppose I am. But remember, they might not be. And you won’t 
know unless you first try to understand. That’s the point. 
Professor Hope: What’s more, you may even discover when you 
do this with people today, that there are far fewer “punks” than you 
thought—that most people, in fact, are not “punks.” 
Dirty Harry: You’re ganging up again. But back to these animal 
trials—I still don’t get it. Those people still seem like punks to me. 
Professor Roe: As I said, we must try to understand their reasons 
for doing what they did, which means we must try to understand their 
views and beliefs about things, which means, again, trying to see 
things through their eyes, through their own prisms and categories. So, 
that is what several scholars have tried to do. I won’t go into all the 
different theories and speculations here, because I don’t need to do that 
to make my point. It will be enough just to consider how Ewald tries to 
do this. So, Ewald examines six or seven different explanations that 
have been put forward for the animal trials over the centuries—that 
their purpose was to make sure the incident would be forgotten, to 
make sure it would not be forgotten, to deter other animals, or to deter 
humans; or to punish demons possessing the animals, Satan using 
them as instruments, or the animals themselves (because they are 
rational creatures who should be held responsible for their actions).134 
Apart from the specific problems Ewald identifies with these 
individual explanations, the basic problem with all of them is that 
although they can explain the remedy or the punishment, for various 
reasons they cannot ultimately explain, or fully explain, the trial.135 
And so Ewald searches for the explanation that can. He concludes that 
Chassenée himself accepted Thomas Aquinas’s view that the animals 
were “the guiltless instruments of Satan” and that the remedies granted 
and punishments inflicted were “an indirect way of cursing the 
Devil.”136 But, despite sometimes cruel punishments, the trial itself 
was “a sign of moral respect.”137 Thus “[w]here we see in a rat or a pig 
either useless vermin or a reservoir of animal protein, [Chassenée] saw 
fellow creatures who enjoyed certain basic rights that can be 
vindicated at law.”138 
                                                
134 Ewald, supra note 107, at 65-69. 
135 See generally id. 
136 Id. at 68-69. 
137 Id. at 73. 
138 Id. 
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Consistently, Ewald rejects the notion that the animal trials and 
punishments were simply brutal and inhumane by modern standards. 
Although some of the punishments were indeed brutal, he reminds us 
that sometimes the animals won and that the parties in the snout beetle 
case even recognized that the beetles had a right to live, observing that 
this “contrasts markedly with the modern attitude” and noting that 
according to one estimate about 27,000 species of animals, mostly 
insects, are going extinct each year due to human activity.139 He 
considers that “[w]e are horrified by the brutality of the animal trials; 
but it does not take much imagination to see that Chassenée would be 
equally horrified by our wanton extermination, without trial, of God’s 
creation.”140 
In this regard, I should note that Ewald identifies two worldviews 
that “still jostled” with one another at the time of Chassenée. The 
medieval worldview, held by Chassenée, “counseled humility, 
resignation, and the insignificance of all things merely human” (given 
humanity’s fallenness), recognized “human beings and animals as 
being alike God’s creatures,” and divided the world into godly humans 
and animals, on the one hand, and ungodly humans and animals, on 
the other.141 The newer, humanist worldview of the Renaissance, 
which set the trajectory for modernity, “saw humanity as participating 
in aspects of the divine” and tended towards dividing the world 
“between the brutal and the humane, with all animals falling in one 
category, and most humans in the other.”142 These differing 
worldviews generated quite different “sensibilities” or “emotional 
responses to the world.”143 
Perhaps Ewald’s explanation of these trials is correct; perhaps it is 
not. My own view is that the trial was not just “a mark of moral 
respect” for the animals but may have had a very practical purpose. 
Thus, a trial may have been held to determine not just the mundane 
facts of the case (did the insects in fact destroy the plaintiff’s crops; 
did the pig in fact crush the child?) but whether or not the animal was, 
in fact, simply the instrument of Satan or, instead, somehow an 
instrument of God, as the snout beetles appeared to be.144 It is 
                                                
139 Id.at 72-73. 
140 Id. at 73. 
141 Id. at 73-74. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 74. 
144 See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the snout beetle case). 
2016 Beyond Punks in Empty Chairs 357 
important to know this before pronouncing a “curse” because it would 
be blasphemous to pronounce a “curse” if the animals were God’s 
instruments.145 Whatever the correct explanation and understanding 
might be, however, Ewald is surely correct when he observes that 
[T]he differences between ourselves and Chassenée exist, 
not just at the level of cognition, but also in the very 
constitution of our moral sentiments. To put the point 
another way: what separates us from Chassenée—what 
makes the animal trials both so elusive and so revealing—is 
not just a shift in a single concept, but in an entire frame of 
reference. We set out to study these strange legal 
proceedings of our ancestors; and at every turn we have been 
brought face-to-face with alien sensibilities, alien 
metaphysics. And by “metaphysics” here I mean 
metaphysics in its most full-blooded sense—the subject that 
addresses such questions as: What is a person? What is an 
animal? What is the essence of freedom? What is justice? 
How is reality constituted, and to what ends? To understand 
Chassenée, it seems, we need to recapture lost images, a 
forgotten range of experience: an entire way of thinking and 
feeling about the world. 146 
So, you see, to understand what was really going on with these 
animal trials, and to understand the people involved in them, we need 
to enter a world with a quite different metaphysics, epistemology, and 
morality than our own. And, in light of all that, do you still think those 
involved in these trials were “punks”? 
Dirty Harry: Okay, I guess I can see that maybe they weren’t 
quite as crazy as I first thought now that you’ve explained what might 
have been going on in their minds. It’s still pretty weird, though. But 
why did you tell me about all this again? I’m still not sure I get the 
point of it. 
Professor Roe: Well, as Professor Hope mentioned earlier, just as 
we needed to try to get into the minds of those ancestors involved in 
the animal trials, so we need to do the same thing when we are dealing 
with other people today, whether they are here in this country or in 
other parts of the world, before we make judgments about them or 
decide on actions and policies based on those judgments. That way, 
our judgments will be better, and so will our actions and policies, just 
as our judgment about the animal trials was better once we had a better 
                                                
145 See Ewald, supra note 107, at 68 (discussing the views of Thomas Aquinas). 
146 Id. at 74. 
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understanding of what might have been going on with them. So we 
first need to listen to others and try to understand them. 
Professor Hope: Karen Armstrong puts it this way in her book 
Twelve Steps to a Compassionate Life: 
The “principle of charity” and the “science of 
compassion” are both crucial to any attempt to understand 
discourse and ideas that initially seem baffling, distressing, 
and alien; we have to re-create the entire context in which 
such words are spoken—historical, cultural, political, 
intellectual—question them deeply, and . . . drive our 
understanding to the point where we have “an immediate 
grasp of what a given position meant.” With this new 
empathetic understanding of the context, we will find that 
we can imagine ourselves, in similar circumstances, feeling 
the same. In other words, we have to see where people are 
coming from. In this way, we can broaden our perspective 
and “make place for the other.” We can ignore this 
compassionate imperative only if we do not wish to 
understand other people—an ethically problematic 
position.147 
Moreover, when we do this, we may well discover that instances of 
the “dark side” of thymos manifested by others are rooted in various 
kinds of emotional pain and suffering, such as frustration, humiliation, 
despair, and fear, and perhaps even a sense of betrayal and atrocity.148 
Of course, remember that developing such empathetic understanding 
                                                
147 ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 139 (citing and quoting MARSHALL G.S. 
HODGSON, 1 THE VENTURE OF ISLAM: CONSCIENCE AND HISTORY IN WORLD 
CIVILIZATION 379 (1974)); see id. at 116-17, 207 n.1. For the phrase “science 
of compassion,” see supra note 125 and accompanying text. For the phrase 
“principle of charity,” see supra note 126 and accompanying text. See also 
SACKS, supra note 60, at 152-53, 158, 168-69, 172, 179-80 (the importance of 
role reversal in Genesis in creating empathy and sympathy and thus in 
humanizing the other and defeating dualism). 
148 For discussion of some examples illustrating this point, see ARMSTRONG, supra 
note 60, at 137 (Jewish, Christian, and Islamic religious fundamentalism), 140 
(terrorists and their sympathetic co-religionists), 146-47 (inhabitants of and 
immigrants from former colonies), 187-88 (our enemy). See also FUKUYAMA, 
supra note 11, at 235-37 (Islamic fundamentalism), 237 (self-segregation of 
African Americans). Such instances may also be part of a bigger picture. See, 
e.g., Bob Dylan, Only a Pawn in Their Game, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-
CHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 1964), http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/only-
pawn-their-game (song about the 1963 murder of a civil rights activist). I am 
indebted to my good friend and colleague, Gary Simson, for this thought and 
Dylan reference. 
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does not preclude judgment; thus “[w]e can never condone cruelty, 
ruthless violence, terrorism, or systemic injustice.”149 However, as 
Armstrong reminds us, we also need to remember that “in a 
threatening environment, the brain becomes permanently organized for 
aggression”150 and that we have our own “dark side” as well.151 And 
we should always be mindful that every human being is a “numinous 
mystery.”152   
An acknowledgement of “mystery” is also at the heart of my good 
friend and colleague Jack Sammons’s proposal for reinvigorating and 
restoring civility to our democratic political conversation in the United 
States.153 Sammons laments “the dead language of an exchange of 
concepts understood as prejudices and interests” that reflect and 
constitute our current “false and incomplete” identities and wants us to 
                                                
149 ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 140, 186. 
150 Id. at 186 (discussing our “enemy”); see also Narvaez, Mature Moral 
Functioning, supra note 60, at 31 (“Situations can promote one ethic or another. 
Fearful situations activate the security ethic, whereas nurturing situations are 
likely to activate the engagement ethic.”); Narvaez, Neurobiology, supra note 
60, at 7-8 (discussing “bunker security” and “vicious imagination,” with 
particular reference to religious fundamentalism). 
151 ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 186 (suggesting that “you, your own nation, and 
your own tradition also have flaws and, in all likelihood, have committed serious 
crimes against others in the past or, perhaps, even in the present” and that, 
“[given] the ‘shadow’ in your own mind . . . [p]erhaps in different 
circumstances, you too would be capable of evil actions”). 
152 Id. at 128. Armstrong is here referring to those “we encounter during the day” 
but the point is surely a more general one.  
 At their most insightful, the religions have insisted that the 
core of each man and woman eludes our grasp and is 
transcendent. . . . Yet most of us fail to express . . . reverence 
for others in our daily lives. All too often we claim 
omniscience about other people, other nations, other cultures, 
and even those we claim to love, and our views about them are 
frequently colored by our own needs, fears, ambitions, and 
desires. . . . Instead of discoursing confidently on other 
people’s motives, intentions, and desires, we should recall the 
essential “mystery” and realize that there is a certain sacrilege 
in attempting to “pluck out” its heart to serve an agenda of our 
own.  
 Id. at 125-27 (referencing Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s attempt to “pluck out 
the heart of [Hamlet’s] mystery”). 
153 Jack L. Sammons, Some Concluding Reflections—Recovering the Political: The 
Problem with Our Political Conversations, 63 MERCER L. REV. 899 (2012). 
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“go beyond [it] to the point of judgment.”154 However, such judgment 
can only be attained if we prepare for and engage in “repeated, long, 
face-to-face talks with opposing others about matters that [are truly] 
serious.”155 Here I take him to be proposing that we need to listen to 
and try to understand one another as we simultaneously seek to 
persuade.156 Thus: 
[We need to] talk more. We need to talk, face-to-face, with 
those we oppose; talk about political matters far more 
serious than what level of taxation is optimal, or how to 
deliver health care, or more serious than abortions, gay 
rights, immigration, race, or what to do about various other 
social inequalities. Pick the issue you care most about right 
now, ask why anyone, you included, should care about it at 
all aside from self-interest; take your most thoughtful answer 
to that question and ask why anyone, you included again, 
should care about the value(s) upon which it rests; take your 
most thoughtful answer to that question and ask what the 
words you just used to describe these value(s) mean, where 
they come from, and why and how they prompt your caring. 
Now offer this thought in as persuasive and as personal a 
manner as you can in a face-to-face political conversation 
with someone with whom you typically disagree, someone 
about whom you might now say you do not understand how 
he could hold the views he does.157 
                                                
154 Id. at 901-02, 912. Sammons observes that our current “false and incomplete” 
identities are “extremely hard to resist, providing as they do a certain security 
and stability.” However,  
 Rather than the comfort of a truer identity, these identities 
produce only constant apprehension, defined as they are 
against others we do not understand and over whom we have 
no real possibility of control. A people so defined feel the 
constant, unrelenting tug of the impossible demands of 
needing to master the wills of difficult others. They feel the 
fear that if this tug is not acted upon, the others, who feel the 
same need, will master them.  
 Id. at 902. 
155 Id. at 911-12. 
156 Id. at 906 (observing that our political conversation “is no longer a rhetorical 
one,” meaning that “speakers in it no longer seek means of persuasion”). 
157 Id. at 905-06. Sammons stresses the importance of the last question “for the idea 
is to get to the openings that language, and only language, can provide.” Id. at 
906 n.25. Sammons emphasizes what he does not envisage:  
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Such “serious” conversations will take us to the place where the 
conversation will point beyond itself to the “ordinary mystery and 
silence that surrounds us,” to the “mysteriousness of our being” which 
is “not us but defines us,” to the “imagined community” or “polity” 
that constitutes our truer, more authentic identity and that informs our 
judgments.158 By engaging in such conversations with humility before 
this mystery and with faith in, and hope for, what it might reveal to 
us,159 we will discover more of the truth about ourselves, recover the 
art of rhetoric, and find our way to an honest and genuine civility.160 
                                                                                                               
 I am not intending to describe a dialectic [seeking objective 
truth]. Nor do I mean to be saying that participation in the 
political conversation requires openness to opposing positions, 
or that all beliefs are to be held tentatively, or that expressed 
beliefs be capable of a publicity of reason or, if religious, 
equally motivated by secular reasons before being offered in 
political conversation. 
 Id. at 907, n.29. However, Sammons concedes that the conversation does require 
“openness,” albeit “not the openness that dialectic requires.” Id. at 908 n.31. The 
openness envisaged, then, seems to be directed towards ensuring listening 
and understanding of an opponent’s position, but not necessarily acceptance of 
that position or modification of one’s own. 
158 Id. at 903, 908, 912 (mystery), 904 (not us but defines us), 904 and n.18 
(imagined community or polity), 901, 902, 912 (inauthentic identities, truer 
identity), 904 and n.18, 908-09 (informing judgments). Regarding the meaning 
of “mystery” as used here, see id. at 903 n.15 (explaining “mystery” not as 
“something that is a mystery to us” but as “something that is mystery, something 
that could not be approached in the way of explanation at all without utterly 
destroying it”). 
159 Id. at 905 (humility), 903-04, 910 (faith), 906-07 (hope). 
160 Id. at. 908-09 (truth about ourselves), 906-07, 909-12 (art of rhetoric), 911 
(civility). Sammons also considers that this will also “bind us to one another 
despite our differences,” including by “providing the motivation to listen to 
speech that seeks (only!) to persuade us.” Id. at 910 and n.35.  
  By including discussion of Jack’s position here I do not mean to imply that 
he considers there is necessarily a moral obligation to understand one’s 
opponent. As Jack explains in a comment on a draft of this Article:  
 My argument begins with the one speaking. It is he who must  
take those steps you quoted and he does so to open himself in 
a way in which listening to others, among other things, does 
not require some external moral motivation for justification. It 
is an attempted practical turn to an appreciation of our 
grounding in mystery which makes any true conversation 
possible. . . The key to it . . . is the turn to language itself. . . . 
The “imagined community” to which I refer is the one opened 
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Karen Armstrong’s “science of compassion” is broader than Jack 
Sammons’s “serious” conversations, both in its intended range of 
application (it is not restricted to democratic political conversation) 
and in the range of considerations to be taken into account in trying to 
understand others.161 However, to recur to our metaphor of the chairs, 
both of them seem to be suggesting that we should pull our chairs 
closer together, lean forward, and listen attentively to what others are 
saying (sometimes, as Armstrong envisages, even when others are not 
speaking to us in actual dialogue).162 
Moreover, Armstrong and Sammons both acknowledge the 
presence and importance of mystery. And here I should point out that 
part of the “mystery” is how we may be transformed ourselves by 
coming to understand others, whether or not our ultimate judgment is 
changed as a result of achieving that understanding. Armstrong’s 
approach tends to the cultivation and exercise of empathy,163 and 
Sammons’s approach tends to the acquisition of a more authentic 
identity, although the “serious” conversations he envisages would 
surely also tend to the cultivation and exercise of empathy. Related, 
                                                                                                               
through this process of self-questioning through language. It is 
the same, one might say, as the imagined community of music.  
 Email from Jack Sammons to Mark Jones (Dec. 18, 2013) (on file with author). 
This said, I hope Jack will accept that if Dirty Harry is still not motivated to 
listen to those he considers “punks” after reading Jack’s lovely article (through 
appreciating the intrinsic value of the conversation and the imagined community 
that it reveals), then perhaps he may be so motivated after reading this one. 
161 This said, there would seem to be no reason why Sammons’s approach could not 
be adapted, mutatis mutandis, to other types of dialogue envisaged by 
Armstrong, in addition to democratic political conversation. 
162 Where there is actual dialogue, of course, listening skills will be critical. For a 
sampling of the literature on listening skills, see, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON 
LISTENING (Andrew D. Wolvin & Carolyn Gwynn Coakley, eds. 1993); Mark 
Weisberg & Jean Koh Peters, Experiments in Listening, 57 J. LEG. ED. 427 
(2007); Neil Hamilton, Effectiveness Requires Listening: How to Assess and 
Improve Listening Skills, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 145 (2011-12). 
163 As the title of her book suggests, Armstrong describes many practical steps, 
methods, and resources designed to cultivate the qualities of empathy and 
compassion. Moreover, in 2008 she announced a major international initiative 
that was launched in 2009—a Charter for Compassion “that would be written by 
leading thinkers from a variety of major faiths and would restore compassion to 
the heart of religious and moral life.” ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 5-6, 8. For 
the text of the Charter, see http://www.charterforcompassion.org/index.php/ 
charter. For further information on the Charter, see http://charterfor 
compassion.org/. 
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where there is actual dialogue (as will often be the case with 
Armstrong and always with Sammons) the parties may give one 
another the gift of a more “authentic,” because more rational, 
recognition and do “spiritual justice” to one another resulting in more 
“spiritual peace” in their souls. Even in the absence of dialogue, just 
the effort to understand another person, to move beyond our own 
preconceptions and prejudices, is likely to effect a thymotic “spiritual 
adjustment” in our souls. Moreover, under both approaches the 
potential for a modification of pre-existing views and positions would 
seem to be considerable and thus our ultimate judgment is indeed 
likely to be different, or certainly more nuanced, in the light of greater 
understanding.164 We may even approach a point, as we learn more 
about others, where we could say, with the Roman playwright 
Terence, “nothing human is foreign to me.”165 
In other words, Inspector Callahan, you are less likely to conclude 
that other people are “punks” once you have come to understand them 
better, and why they believe what they believe and do what they do. 
Dirty Harry: Okay, well let’s assume, for the heck of it, that if I 
tried to understand those people I now think are punks, then I might 
see that they’re not really punks. Why should I do that? What do I 
actually get out of it? This Karen Armstrong person seems to be 
suggesting I will become more empathetic and compassionate. And 
this Sammons guy says I will acquire a “more authentic identity” if I 
do this in political conversations. And you say that I will get a more 
“authentic recognition” through dialogue in which another person 
listens to and tries to understand me as well, and that that this will give 
me “spiritual justice” and “spiritual peace” in my own soul too, which 
is along the lines of what you said before, and now you say that I will 
get some “spiritual adjustment” even in the absence of dialogue. Well, 
even if the other person isn’t really a punk, why should I care? 
Suppose all those things don’t really grab me as a motivation? 
Suppose I can get much more of what I want—more material things 
                                                
164 The CIA employs this kind of approach “to teach its intelligence-gathering 
analysts to think more wisely and open-mindedly,” although one suspects that 
achieving “spiritual justice” and “spiritual peace” is not uppermost among their 
purposes. See NEWBERG & WALDMAN, supra note 123, at 258-60 (describing 
eight strategies used by the CIA in its “[w]ar against [b]iases”). 
165 KRONMAN, supra note 106, at 159 (quoting the “old Roman motto” from 
Terence); see also Curran, supra note 122, at 123 (“Such bridging of distances 
as we are likely to realize [through cultural immersion] will entail mutual 
transformations in the process of comprehension.”). 
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and more thymotic satisfaction—by and even violence, especially if 
“my gun is bigger than the other guy’s” (which, as you know, it is)? I 
already told you I didn’t feel the need for any “recognition” from 
punks. And quite frankly, I don’t feel the need to be more empathetic 
and compassionate, to acquire some “authentic identity” from our 
shared “mystery,” or to get “recognition” and “spiritual justice” and 
“spiritual peace” even from those who aren’t punks. I’m just fine as I 
am thank you. 
Father Pope: Are you really, Inspector? That’s not what you told 
us before: You said you were looking for a “better way to a better 
world” because your old way was getting you down. Quite honestly, I 
think you have identified a real problem, maybe even the biggest 
problem. The problem is that the way we are made—or perhaps I 
should say, the way we are made in a fallen world—we are all 
naturally selfish. Sure we can be altruistic and selfless too sometimes, 
but it is a constant battle for us.166 Even if things like justice and peace, 
listening and understanding, empathy and compassion, authentic 
identity and authentic recognition sound good in theory, it is so hard to 
do the things necessary to achieve them in practice because we are 
broken people living in a broken world. So the challenge is not only to 
find ways to achieve these things; it is finding ways to help us 
overcome our natural selfishness in order to want, or desire, them 
strongly enough in the first place. 
Perhaps what we need to do, then, is to try to see through the 
surface appearances of all our divisions to the reality of our underlying 
common humanity. When asked to pray at a mixed gathering with 
people of different religions and no religion, I like to use an inclusive 
prayer that says “We pray as children of a common Father.”167 But 
                                                
166 See CATECHISM, supra note 83, at § 1707 (“[Man] still desires the good, but his 
nature bears the wound of original sin.”); CATHOLIC CHURCH, PASTORAL 
CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD: GAUDIEM ET SPES 
13 § 2 (1965) (“[M]an is split within himself. As a result, all of human life, 
whether individual or collective, shows itself to be a dramatic struggle between 
good and evil, between light and darkness.”) [hereinafter GAUDIEM ET SPES]; 
see also supra note 60 (discussing neurobiological aspects of moral functioning, 
and our “old” brain, limbic system, and “new” brain). Moreover, even our 
altruism may become corrupted and turn into “altruistic evil” in which, while 
altruistically beholden to our own in-group, we do evil to out-groups in the name 
of an “altruistic cause.” See supra notes 60, 63 (discussing reciprocal altruism 
and altruistic evil respectively). 
167 This prayer form was used for many years by Father Thomas Healy, 
distinguished alumnus of Mercer University and Mercer Law School and a 
priest in the Roman Catholic diocese of Savannah, when he offered prayers at 
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what does this mean? I think it means two things, First, it means that 
each of us is of immeasurable worth and dignity in the eyes of the God 
who created us and who loves us.168 Remember how, on Fukuyama’s 
account, Hegel-Kojève stressed that “[t]he Christian God recognizes 
all human beings universally, recognizes their individual human worth 
and dignity.”169 I think that this understates the position because our 
worth and dignity in the eyes of God are “immeasurable.” That is what 
it means to be a “child of God” who is created “in the image and 
likeness” of God.170 Think how you feel about your own children.171 
And we must avoid the temptation to get caught up in a numbers 
game. Numbers may mean something at the merely human level but 
                                                                                                               
various Law School events in the 1980s. I think it fair to say that Father Healy’s 
prayers touched everyone who heard them. 
168 See CATECHISM, supra note 83, at §§ 219-21 (on God’s love). 
169 FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 197 (quoted supra note 52 and accompanying 
text). 
170 See, e.g., CATECHISM, supra note 83, at § 222, § 225 (stating that believing in 
and loving the One God “means knowing the unity and true dignity of all men: 
Everyone is made in the image and likeness of God”) (emphasis added). Section 
1700 states: “The dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the 
image and likeness of God; . . . it is fulfilled in his vocation to divine 
beatitude . . . . It is essential to a human being freely to direct himself to this 
fulfillment.”  Section 1730 states that “God created man a rational being, 
conferring on him the dignity of a person who can initiate and control his own 
actions,” and that “[m]an is rational and therefore like God; he is created with 
free will and is master over his acts.” Early in his pontificate, Pope Francis 
emphasized that everyone, without exception, is a “child of God.” See Pope at 
Mass: Culture of Encounter is the Foundation of Peace, VATICAN RADIO (May 
22, 2013), http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2013/05/22/pope_at_mass:_culture_ 
of_encounter_is_the_foundation_of_peace/en1-694445: 
 The Lord created us in His image and likeness, and we are the 
image of the Lord . . . The Lord has redeemed all of us, all of 
us, with the Blood of Christ: all of us, not just Catholics. 
Everyone! . . . Even the atheists. . . . And we all have a duty to 
do good. And this commandment for everyone to do good, I 
think, is a beautiful path towards peace. . . We are created 
children in the likeness of God . . . [W]e are all children of 
God, all of us, all of us! And God loves us, all of us!  
 For a discussion of analogous sensibilities in all the major religious and wisdom 
traditions, emphasizing the cultivation and exercise of empathy and compassion, 
see ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 29-64, 116-30. 
171 Cf. Matthew 7:11 (New Am. Rev. ed. 2011) (“If you then, who are wicked, 
know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your 
heavenly Father give good things to those who ask him.”). 
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when we are talking about God, who is infinite, numbers are 
meaningless. To think in terms of numbers in some utilitarian fashion 
with regard to God is, quite simply, a fundamental category mistake.172 
Second, the prayer means that we are related to one another as 
children through our common Creator; that we are, then, in a very real 
sense—in a spiritual, not a biological, sense—sisters and brothers to 
one another. And if we were able to see one another in this way, as 
such brothers and sisters who all have immeasurable worth as God’s 
children, wouldn’t that be a strong motivation for trying to overcome 
our natural selfishness and for making the effort to be empathetic and 
compassionate in order to seek justice and peace? 
But, you will ask, how can we come to see each other this way, not 
just cognitively, which is inadequate, but also affectively? How can 
we, in other words, develop the necessary “sensibilities”? Well, 
wouldn’t the knowledge that we are of immeasurable worth in the 
sight of God, that we are valued and loved by the Creator of the 
universe, provide the greatest and most authentic thymotic satisfaction 
of all? Remember that we distinguished earlier between unhealthy 
pride and a healthy sense of self-worth, a healthy pride if you will, that 
comes from knowing one is valued and loved by God.173 And we said 
it was a paradox because pride is regarded as a sin.174 However, it is 
only an apparent paradox because we have to remember the other side 
of the equation—humility before God. In other words, as I said before, 
thymos has to undergo a type of transformation in which we 
acknowledge that we have received the world, ourselves, and one 
another as Gift that is entrusted to us as stewards.175 In this way, there 
may still be a place for a healthy form of thymos in the divine 
                                                
172 See, e.g., ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 53-54 (explaining that in the Talmudic 
view of creation “all human beings were made in God’s image,” murder and 
even humiliation of another was “a sacrilege,” and “God had created only one 
man at the beginning of time to teach us that destroying a single human life was 
equivalent to annihilating the world, while to save a life redeemed the entire 
human race”); SACKS, supra note 60, at 194, 201 (“God . . . has set his image in 
each of us. That is why every life is sacred and each life is like a universe.”), 
266 (“Islam, like Judaism, counts a single life as a universe”). 
173 Supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
174 Id.; see Outler, supra note 85 (Saint Augustine: “[God] dost resist the proud”]. 
175 See supra note 84 and accompanying text; CATECHISM, supra note 83, at § 224 
(believing in and loving the One God “means living in thanksgiving: if God is 
the only One, everything we are and have comes from him”) (emphasis added); 
see also § 299 (“creation as a gift addressed to man” and “a spirit of humility 
and respect before the Creator and his work”). 
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economy. In fact, I think that this is how it is supposed to work in 
Christianity and religion more generally (or at least in the monotheistic 
religions)—and although Hegel-Kojève seem to have understood this 
at some level, ultimately they seem to miss the point. They seem to 
suggest that Christianity was not really concerned with our earthly 
lives and therefore needed to be secularized before we could expect 
any real improvement in those lives.176 However, as you know, the two 
great commandments of Christianity are to love God and to love your 
neighbor as yourself,177 and loving your neighbor as yourself means 
more than caring about the fate of their immortal soul. Although that is 
important, it certainly does not justify being indifferent to their 
circumstances here on earth.178 
And I would say that awareness that we are valued and loved by 
the God in whose eyes we, like others, have immeasurable worth, and 
that we have received one another (and everything else) as Gift—and 
this means the chairs in which we all sit and the human beings who sit 
in those chairs—would engender such gratitude that it would demand, 
in turn, that we recognize the same immeasurable value of others. That 
would be irresistible surely—at least it would be if we truly believed 
it.179 And this would then give us the motivation for making the effort 
                                                
176 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
177 Matthew 22: 34-40, Mark 12: 28-34, Luke 10:25-28 (New Am. Rev. ed. 2011); 
see ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 29-64 (discussing these commandments in 
Christianity and the analogous positions in other religious and wisdom 
traditions). 
178 See CATECHISM, supra note 83, Part Three (Life in Christ), especially Section 
One, Chapter Two, Article 3 (Social Justice) and Section Two, Chapter Two 
(“You Shall Love Your Neighbor As Yourself”). For example, the Article on 
Social Justice states, in Section 1929, that “[s]ocial justice can be achieved only 
in respecting the transcendent dignity of man” . . . in Section 1930, that 
“[r]espect for the human person entails respect for the rights that flow from his 
dignity as a creature” . . . in Section 1931, that “[r]espect for the human person 
proceeds by way of respect for the principle that ‘everyone should look upon his 
neighbor (without any exception) as another self, above all bearing in mind his 
life and the means necessary for living it with dignity’” . . . in Sections 1932-
1933, that “[t]he duty of making oneself a neighbor to others and actively 
serving them . . . extends to those who think or act differently from us”. . . . Id. 
(quoting GAUDIEM ET SPES, supra note 166, at 27 § 1). 
179 Of course, to reach this point of belief, we have to overcome the mimetic desire 
of our various sibling rivalries by recognizing that God’s love is inexhaustible 
and that being loved by God is not a zero-sum game. See SACKS, supra note 60, 
at 102, 141-43, 203-04, 266. Thus “[t]he truth that shines through the Genesis 
texts is that we are each blessed by God, each precious in his sight, each with 
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to try to understand one another, and for exercising the empathy and 
compassion we need to do that. Pace Hegel-Kojève, then, perhaps the 
problem with Christianity, as has been famously remarked by others, is 
not that it has been “tried and found wanting” but that it has never 
actually been “tried.”180 
Dirty Harry: Well, I suppose it might provide the motivation if, as 
you say, we truly believed in that kind of inclusive, loving God. But 
suppose I don’t even believe in God? Then what? 
Professor Hope: May I jump in here, Father? Of course, there are 
philosophers who have sought to provide non-religious accounts of 
inherent human dignity; and here one thinks especially of philosophers 
in the Kantian tradition. However, there is a problem in finding and 
justifying a secular foundation for such dignity.181 Instead of trying to 
grapple with the thorny issues raised by this problem, which are 
beyond my expertise anyway—and at this hour, I suspect that 
Professor Logie does not want to get into them either—let me see if I 
can take something Father Pope has just said in a different direction by 
putting it together with something Professor Logie told us about. 
Specifically, Professor Logie explained that Hobbes, Locke, and 
Hegel all proposed “experiments in thought” to get at the essence of 
human nature by positing the situation of the “first men” in the state of 
nature,182 For Hegel, you will recall, it was a bloody battle for pure 
prestige at the very beginning of history.183 Well, I would like to 
propose another “experiment in thought”—an apocalyptic one focused 
on the end of history. Let’s assume that there has been a cataclysm of 
some kind and you are the last human being left alive on the planet, or 
so it seems. I am sure you are familiar with the idea from various sci-fi 
movies.184 Fukuyama entitles his book The End of History and the Last 
                                                                                                               
our own role in his story, each with our own song in the music of humankind.” 
Id. at 266. 
180 G.K. Chesterton famously said: “The Christian ideal has not been tried and 
found wanting. It has been found difficult and left untried.” G.K. CHESTERTON, 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE WORLD Part I, Chapter 5 (1910). 
181 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 
(1998) (especially chapter 1). 
182 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. 
184 For an illustrative listing, see http://blogs.indiewire.com/theplaylist/the-10-best-
last-man-on-earth-movies-20130418; see also http://www.google.com/#sclient 
=psy-ab&q=apocalyptic+and+post-apocalyptic+fiction+movies (providing an 
extensive list of apocalyptic and post-apocalyptic fiction). 
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Man and his “last man” refers to the paradigmatic type of human being 
that lives in liberal democracy at the end of History.185 But I am 
proposing that we imagine a literal last man (or woman). 
Imagine, then, that you find one other human being alive. How 
have things changed? Unless the other person is really insane or 
psychopathic, wouldn’t you be ecstatically grateful to have found 
someone to be your companion? And would it matter any longer if that 
person was of a different religion, or a different race, or if they had 
supported the other political party, or had accepted same-sex marriage 
and you had not, or vice-versa? Indeed, would it even matter if they 
had been one of the enemy with whom your country had been at war? 
In other words, would any of those things that used to divide you from 
one another be of any importance? If not, doesn’t that show that these 
causes of division are all social constructions—and even if you didn’t 
believe this and believed instead that at least some of those divisions 
were rooted in some transcendent truth, would that really matter any 
longer? Instead of caring about all those things that used to divide you, 
wouldn’t you cherish the other person? Wouldn’t that other person 
now be the most important thing in the world to you? Indeed, wouldn’t 
they be of immeasurable worth to you? Wouldn’t you want to listen to 
them and really get to know them and to work with them so you could 
help one another face your post-apocalyptic world together?186 And if 
you would feel that way, isn’t it likely that the other person would feel 
the same? Your chairs are gone. All you have is each another.187 
So, if you are unable to see the other person, your antagonist in 
conflict, or people more generally, as another child of God or as 
having special human dignity for other reasons, and even if you can, 
perhaps you could try to see them in this way, imagining that they 
were the only other human being left alive on the planet. And perhaps 
this could supply the motivation, or the additional motivation, you 
need to make the effort to be empathetic and compassionate and to try 
to achieve justice and peace between you.188 
                                                
185 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
186 The movies of which I am aware that come closest to addressing such issues in 
this imagined situation are The World, the Flesh, and the Devil (Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer 1959) and Enemy Mine (20th Century Fox 1985). It is my 
recollection of the latter movie that first inspired this thought experiment. 
187 We often see something of this spirit, I think, in the way people pull together in 
the wake of a natural disaster. 
188 Let me be clear here. I am far from suggesting that we can simply wish away all 
our differences, divisions, and conflicts through this simple “experiment in 
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And before you answer that you have told people you wouldn’t 
want to be around them “even if you were the last person on earth,” I 
am not talking about some flippant expression you use to dismiss and 
hurt someone who hurt you and whom you may even think you hate. I 
am talking about the real deal. You have to try to imagine this really 
happening. If you like, you can even imagine it being the same person 
who hurt you or whom you think you hate. Perhaps in their case, you 
would not have to get to know them because you already do, or at least 
you think you do. But even so . . . even in their case . . . think hard, 
Inspector . . . think very, very hard before you answer. 
Dirty Harry (after a very long and thoughtful pause): Yeah, but 
suppose they really are insane or a psychopath? Wouldn’t they just be 
a punk? 
Professor Hope, Professor Logie, Professor Roe, and Father 
Pope (in unison): I think we all need another drink. 
__________________ 
AFTERWORD 
Then, as I probed them, one sprang up, and stared 
With piteous recognition in fixed eyes, 
Lifting distressful hands as if to bless 
“I see you”189 
                                                                                                               
thought” (or even by seeing the other person as another “child of God”). After 
all, we do not in fact live in such a post-apocalyptic world—at least not yet. My 
goal is a much more modest one, yet quite ambitious enough. It is that we try to 
treat one another better and achieve at least some increase in peace and justice, 
as we seek to address and work through our differences, divisions, and conflicts, 
by stimulating our moral imagination to “see” one another more clearly. Perhaps 
then our clashing thymoi will not be quite as noisy, or as violent. If you would 
like another movie reference, I suggest Avatar. See Avatar (20th Century Fox 
2009) (“I see you”), http://james-camerons-avatar.wikia.com/wiki/I_See_You. 
For the scene, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-u5SiCCmVv0. 
189 Emphasis added. Cf. SACKS, supra note 60, at 133-34, 203-04 (seeing the “face” 
of the Other and of God), 159-60 (“Genesis is about recognition and non-
recognition in the deepest sense, about the willingness to accord dignity to the 
other rather than see the other as a threat.”). In discussing “faces,” Sacks 
acknowledges the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Id. at 278-79 n.6. For a concise 
discussion of Levinas’ work addressing our ethical need to encounter the “face” 
of the “infinite other” in order to receive the world we are given, see LINDA 
ROSS MEYER, THE JUSTICE OF MERCY 39-41 (2010). 
  In a comment on a draft of this Article Jack Sammons suggests that instead 
of my decontextualizing thought experiment we might see each other more 
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clearly and be more motivated to honor the human in the other if we imagined 
the other in a richer and more realistic human context:  
 [F]or example, imagin[e] that the asshole at the checkout 
counter just lost someone dear to him or her, someone who 
mattered most in his or her life. Or, another example, imagine 
the person you are hating at home, alone, praying. Or, my 
favorite, imagine him or her as creative in a way that moves 
you, i.e., imagine that he or she has carved a small, delicate, 
and truly beautiful sculpture, or composed a nocturne, or 
imagine him or her playing a chaconne on the guitar, and so 
forth.  
 Email from Jack Sammons, supra note 160. I am certainly not opposed to such 
an approach. Perhaps both can be offered and readers can then choose either to 
try both approaches or alternatively to try the one they think would work better 
for them (and these choices may be different for different readers). 
